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INTRODUCTION
In 1973, members of the American Bar Association (ABA), Section
on Patent, Trademark and Copyright (hereinafter the PTC Section)
faced a dilemma. For more than six years, they had written, scrutinized,
1
debated, and re-worked a draft uniform law to govern trade secrets. In
August 1972, their efforts finally bore fruit when a draft law was read
before the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
2
Laws (hereinafter NCCUSL). At the time, and despite the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decisions in the Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. and
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. (hereinafter Sears/Compco)
3
cases, it was thought that states could regulate in the area of trade
4
secrets without interfering with federal patent policies. With the
decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kewanee Oil Co. v.
5
Bicron Corp., however, this conclusion was called into question, and
further consideration of a uniform trade secrets act was suspended
pending clarification from the U.S. Supreme Court or an act of
6
Congress.

1. See Protection of Confidential Rights and Know-How, 1967 A.B.A. SEC. PAT.,
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. §107, at 59 (report of James M.
Heilman, Chairman, Comm. 107) and Trade Secrets, Interference with Contracts and Related
Matters, 1967 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402,
at 140 (report of Robert E. Isner, Chairman, Comm. 402). In 1966, Committee 107
recommended “in recognition of the increasing state legislation and some court decisions
dealing with this subject,” that the ABA study the advisability of a uniform state law for the
protection of trade secrets. Protection of Confidential Rights and Know-How, 1968 A.B.A.
SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. §107, at 68 (report of
Leonard B. Mackey, Chairman, Comm. 107).
2. Uniform Trade Secrets Act (1979) [hereinafter UTSA].
3. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964), Compco Corp. v. DayBrite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964), and notes and accompanying text are available
at Section I.A., infra.
4. See Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971), Servo Corp. of Am. v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964), Water Serv., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d
163 (5th Cir. 1969), Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th
Cir. 1965), Dekar Indus., Inc. v. Bissett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970).
5. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. et al., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973), is referred to
herein as Bicron to distinguish it from the U.S. Supreme Court case of the same name, which
is referred to as Kewanee. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 492 (1974).
6. See Trade Secrets, Interference with Contracts, and Related Matters, 1971 A.B.A. SEC.
PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP., § 402, at 224 (report of Henry E.
Otto, Jr., Chairman, Subcomm. C) (“The future of our efforts and those of the Special
Committee to urge adoption of a Uniform Trade Secrets Protection Act, will, of course, be in
doubt unless and until the Congress enacts legislation negating any federal intent to preempt
control over causes of action for unfair competition.”). See also Trade Secrets, Interference
with Contracts, and Related Matters, 1974 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
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The PTC Section did not have to wait long for the clarification it
needed. In its 1974 decision in Kewanee, a divided Supreme Court ruled
7
that Ohio’s trade secret law was not preempted by patent law.
Rejecting the fact-specific analysis that had been applied by the Sixth
Circuit and calls for application of so-called “partial preemption,” the
Court concluded that trade secret protection did not “constitute too
8
great an encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated.”
Based upon this conclusion, the PTC Section resumed its efforts to
enact a uniform law in early 1975, ultimately culminating in NCCUSL’s
approval of the Uniform Trade Secret Act (hereinafter the UTSA) in
August 1979, and the subsequent adoption of the UTSA by forty-five
9
states.
While the decision of the Supreme Court in Kewanee is frequently
cited for the proposition that state trade secret laws are not preempted
by federal law, this broad proposition belies five aspects of the decision.
First, Kewanee is based upon the Supreme Court’s understanding of the
10
trade secret law of the State of Ohio. Although the Ohio common law
governing trade secrets was found not to be preempted by federal
patent policies, Kewanee is not a direct endorsement of the trade secret
11
laws of all states. Second, Kewanee was decided before the enactment
of the UTSA, and the Court has not subsequently determined whether

COMMITTEE REP. § 402, 254 (report of James R. Adams, Chairman Subcomm. B) (noting
that the activities of Committee 402 concerning the UTSA were on hold pending the outcome
of Kewanee).
7. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 492 (1974), is referred to herein as
Kewanee to distinguish it from the Sixth Circuit case of the same name, which is referred to
herein as Bicron. Bicron, 478 F.2d at 1074. The Chief Justice was joined in the opinion by
Justices Blackmun, Stewart, Rehnquist, and White. Justice Powell took no part in the
decision. Justice Marshall filed an opinion concurring in the result. Justice Douglas wrote a
dissent in which Justice Brennan concurred.
8. Kewanee, 416 U.S. 470 at 482.
9. UTSA, supra note 2. History and information about the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/Desktop
Default.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=11 (last visited Jan. 3, 2008). The only states that have not
adopted the UTSA are Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Texas.
See id.
10. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 474-76.
11. According to briefs that were before the Court, it was represented that the Ohio
statutory law governing trade secrets was a codification of the common law “that has long
been in effect in Ohio and in other States.” Brief for Amicus Curiae Manufacturing Chemists
Association at 11, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). At the time of
Kewanee, however, the trade secret laws of the various states were far from uniform. See
Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade Secret
Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 681-87 (2006).
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the UTSA is preempted by federal law. Third, Kewanee was decided
based upon the Court’s understanding of U.S. patent law in 1974 and
does not reflect the significant changes in patent law that have occurred
since that time. Fourth, due to changes that occurred in U.S. copyright
law post-Kewanee, the Court did not consider the possibility that trade
secret law may interfere with federal copyright policies. Finally, the
Kewanee decision is based upon the Supreme Court’s preemption
jurisdiction circa 1974 and does not reflect its current views on
preemption including, in particular, the reasoning of the Court’s
decision in the 1989 case of Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
12
Inc.
This Article revisits the issues raised in Kewanee in light of the
Supreme Court’s current preemption jurisprudence, the numerous
changes that have been made to patent, copyright, and trade secret law
since 1974, and the resulting and significant overlaps that exist between
those intellectual property doctrines. To set the stage for what will
ultimately be a critique of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Kewanee,
the Article begins with a review of the history and context of the
Kewanee decision. In Section II, the Supreme Court and court of
appeals cases that set the stage for Kewanee are summarized. In Section
III, the reasoning of Kewanee and the legal and factual assumptions
upon which it is based are explained.
Section IV of the Article details the key changes that have been
made to patent, copyright, and trade secret law since 1974. Section V
then explores whether, in light of those changes, the Kewanee Court’s
preemption analysis has withstood the test of time. Although, like the
Court in Kewanee, this Article concludes that the UTSA is not
preempted by federal law, it reveals the weaknesses in the Kewanee
Court’s reasoning and applies a different preemption analysis. The
Article concludes in Section VI by detailing a simplified analysis for
what this author calls “IP preemption,” to be applied to all state laws
that appear to protect content falling within the ambit of patent or
copyright law. In so doing, this Article presages the difficulties that
state lawmakers will face if they attempt to expand the current scope of
13
trade secret law, e.g., by adopting so-called “data exclusivity” laws.
12. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
13. For example, the 1984 Hatch-Waxman amendments to the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act established a five-year data exclusivity period for new drug applications
containing new chemical entities that have not been previously approved by the FDA alone
or in combination with other chemical entities. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §
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I. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF KEWANEE
A. The Sears/Compco Doctrine
The Kewanee case was not the first time that the U. S. Supreme
Court considered whether state law was preempted by U.S. patent law.
Just ten years earlier in the Sears/Compco cases, the Court ruled that
state unfair competition laws could be preempted by federal patent
14
Both the Sears and Compco cases involved claims that the
law.
defendants engaged in unfair competition by copying the design of light
15
fixtures sold by the plaintiffs. Due to the perceived novelty of each
light fixture, the plaintiffs had obtained patents and brought their claims
in federal court alleging patent infringement under federal law and
16
When the patents were held
unfair competition under state law.
invalid, the only question before the courts was whether the defendants’
acts of copying the design of the light fixtures constituted unfair
competition under Illinois law. Finding such a violation, the trial court
entered judgment for plaintiffs. After the decisions of the district court
17
were affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider “whether the use of a state unfair
competition law to give relief against the copying of an unpatented

355(j)). During this period the FDA cannot accept drug applications that rely on these data.
Id.
Although data exclusivity laws arguably have a limited purpose in that they are designed
to protect proprietary information that is submitted to the Government, the linkage of the
concept of data exclusivity with trade secret law in Article 39 of the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property [hereinafter TRIPS] Agreement of the World Trade Organization has
led some to believe that there is (or should be) an independent and enforceable right of data
exclusivity, generally, even if the data to be protected is not a trade secret. See Sharon K.
Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name Is Still a Contract: Examining the Effectiveness of
Trade Secret Clauses to Protect Data Bases, 45 IDEA 119, 142-44 (2005). This broader view of
the scope of trade secret law was, however, rejected by the drafters of the UTSA. Id.
14. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964) and Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
15. In the Sears case, the light fixture was a pole lamp described as “a vertical tube
having fixtures along the outside, the tube being made so that it will stand upright between
the floor and ceiling of the room.” Sears, 376 U.S. at 225-26. As a child, I recall having such a
lamp in our home because I was often caught playing with it. I was fascinated by its
telescoping tubing and the twisting mechanism inside that allowed the lamp to be secured
between the floor and ceiling. The Compco case concerned a fluorescent ceiling fixture with
reflective “cross-ribs” that the plaintiff claimed made the fixture stronger and more attractive.
Compco, 376 U.S. at 234.
16. Compco, 376 U.S. at 234; Sears 376 U.S. at 226.
17. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963) and Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 27 (7th Cir. 1962).
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industrial design conflicts with the federal patent laws.”
The decision of the Illinois court reflected a prevalent sentiment
among state law makers and members of the judiciary concerning the
19
unfairness of copying a competitor’s product. Indeed, as of 1974 when
the Kewanee case was decided, a rich body of common law had
developed that proscribed a litany of acts that constituted unfair
20
competition. Due to the fact that patent law is within the exclusive
purview of the U.S. Congress and the federal judiciary and, as a result, is
often misunderstood by state court judges and state law makers, there
was not much occasion prior to the Sears/Compco cases for state courts
to reflect upon the potential conflict between federal patent policy and
state unfair competition law.
In ruling that the unfair competition laws of Illinois conflicted with
U.S. patent law, the Court in Sears noted that patent law has its basis in
21
the U.S. Constitution and is “the supreme law of the land.” It further
explained that “it is ‘familiar doctrine’ that the federal policy ‘may not
22
be set at naught, or its benefits denied’ by state law.”
While
acknowledging that the principal purpose of federal patent law is to
23
encourage innovation, the Court was careful to recognize the duality
that is built into U.S. patent law. On one hand, U.S. patent law reflects
a desire to encourage innovation. On the other hand, it seeks to
24
encourage that innovation without unduly restricting free competition.
As the court explained, “the patent system is one in which uniform
federal standards are carefully used to promote invention while at the
25
same time preserving free competition.” The Court emphasized that
inventions that do not meet the strict requirements of patent law or that
26
are the subject of an expired patent belong to the public.
Because Illinois law sought to protect an article of commerce that
was not protected under U.S. patent law, the Court concluded that there

18. Compco, 376 U.S. at 234.
19. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, §§ 711 and 741 (ALI 1938) and Harry
D. Nims, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS, Chapter X, “Simulation
of Articles Themselves,” (Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1947).
20. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, Division Nine, “Interference with Business
Relations” (ALI 1938) and RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (ALI 1994).
21. Sears, 376 U.S. at 229.
22. Id. at 229, quoting Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
23. Id. at 229.
24. Id. at 230.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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was “too great an encroachment on the federal patent system.” This is
because Illinois law restricted free competition in areas where federal
patent law said it could not.
Until the decisions in the Sears/Compco cases, state unfair
competition law had peacefully co-existed with federal law. Indeed,
since the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Erie R.R. v.
28
Tompkins in 1938, it was understood that only states could develop a
29
common law of unfair competition. The decisions in Sears/Compco
created doubt about the role of states in preventing unfair competition
and led to concern about the continued viability of state trade secret
30
law. This concern explains why the PTC Section decided in 1966 to
31
consider the need for a uniform trade secret law. It was thought that in
order to preserve the law of unfair competition it was necessary to
32
either enact a federal law or draft a uniform state law that could not be
33
preempted.
The perceived need for a legislative solution to the
34
Sears/Compco doctrine became more urgent when its principles were
27. Id. at 232.
28. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
29. See, e.g., Louis Kunin, Erieandtompkinitis: The Malady and Its Cure, 1961 A.B.A.
SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. SUMMARY OF PROC. 276; Note, Trade-Marks,
Unfair Competition, and the Courts: Some Unsettled Aspects of the Lanham Act, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 1094, 1101 (1953) (noting that until the adoption of the Lanham Act, “federal courts
were required by the Erie rule to decide unfair competition claims in diversity cases according
to state law.”); Note, Trade Secrets Law After Sears and Compco, 53 VA. L. REV. 356 (1967).
30. See John R. Peterson, The Legislative Mandate of Sears and Compco: A Plea for a
Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 16, 25 (1966); Comment, Theft of
Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 378 (1971).
31. See Protection of Confidential Rights and Know-How, 1967 A.B.A. SEC. PAT.,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 107, at 59 (report of James M. Heilman,
Chairman, Comm. 107) and Trade Secrets, Interference with Contracts and Related Matters,
1967 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 140
(report of Robert E. Isner, Chairman, Comm. 402).
st
32. See, e.g., S. 2756, 91 Cong., §301 (1969) ( “This title shall not be construed to
preempt, or otherwise affect in any way, contractual or other rights or obligations, not in the
nature of patent rights, imposed by State or Federal law on particular parties with regard to
inventions or discoveries, whether or not subject to this title.”).
33. Louis Kunin, The Lindsay Bill Before and After the Stiffel Case, 54 TRADEMARK
REP. 731, 736 (1964), citing Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition Under the Lanham
Act, 38 TRADEMARK REP. 259 (1948) (“Federal unfair competition legislation to counteract
the effects of Erie was suggested by Mr. Edward S. Rogers speaking before the Practising
Law Institute at New York City in 1947.”). See also Herbert David Klein, The Technical
Trade Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 437-44 (1960). Undoubtedly, the
efforts of the lawyer-members of the PTC Committee were also influenced by the needs and
desires of their business clients. J. ROGER O’MEARA, HOW SMALLER COMPANIES
PROTECT THEIR TRADE SECRETS (The Conference Board, Inc. 1971).
34. The Sears/Compco doctrine is also referred to as “the Stiffel doctrine.”
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applied to question not only the continued viability of state trade secret
law but also the enforceability of contracts involving the licensing of
35
unpatented technology.
B. Applying the Sears/Compco Doctrine to Trade Secret Cases
Viewed broadly, the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Sears/Compco
cases threatened the viability of most state unfair competition claims
36
including claims for trade secret misappropriation. Thus, it was not
long after those decisions that defendants in trade secret cases asserted
federal preemption as a defense. More often than not, this defense
37
38
proved unsuccessful. However, in a number of cases, it worked. In
other cases, while the courts continued to recognize the viability of trade
secret claims, they were careful to explain that it was the limited scope
39
of trade secret law that prevented federal preemption.
Three post-Sears/Compco cases, in particular, attracted the attention

35. See infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
36. The one exception was state claims for trademark infringement, since the Court in
Sears/Compco explicitly recognized the continued viability of such claims. Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
37. See, e.g., Servo Corp. of Am., v. Gen. Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716, 724 (4th Cir. 1964);
Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Comp. Controls, Inc., 297 A.2d 437 (Sp. Ct. Del.
1972); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 366 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1973);
Dekar Indus., Inc. v. Bissett-Berman, 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970); Water Servs., Inc. v.
Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 172 (5th Cir.1969); and Schulenberg v. Signatrol, Inc., 212
N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ill. 1965).
38. See, e.g., Painton & Co., Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971) and
Titelock Carpet Strip Co. v. Klasner, 142 U.S.P.Q. 405 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1964). See also
Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 138 (9th Cir. 1965)
(noting that Sears/Compco precludes protection of industrial information separate and apart
from the interest states have in protecting the integrity of confidential employer-employee
relationships) and Hampton v. Blair Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1967) (applying
Sears/Compco to limit the duration of an injunction in a trade secret misappropriation case).
39. See, e.g., Winston Research , 350 F.2d at 136-37 (noting a difference between claims
based on “a legally protectible interest in the secrecy of industrial information as such” (i.e., a
property rule) and claims based on “the integrity of confidential employer-employee
relationships” (i.e., a tort/breach of confidence rule), the court found that the rationale of
Sears/Compco precluded recognition of a state claim not based on “breach of faith and
reprehensible means of learning another’s secret”); Dekar, 434 F.2d at 1306 (noting the
limited scope of the challenged injunctive order); Servo Corp., 337 F.2d at 724-25 (noting the
requirement of a breach of a confidential relationship); Water Servs., Inc., 410 F.2d at 172
(noting that Georgia trade secret law required that the information be secret and that it be
revealed in confidence); Blazon, Inc. v. DeLuxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416, 433 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (emphasizing the breach of a confidential relationship aspects of trade secret law); and
Van Prods. Co. v. Gen. Welding & Fabricating Co., 213 A.2d 769, 773-74 (Pa. 1965) (noting
that the gravamen of the complaint is a breach of confidence).
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of the proponents of state trade secret laws. The first was the U.S.
40
Next, in
Supreme Court’s 1969 decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins.
February of 1970, was the district court’s decision in Painton & Co. v.
41
Bourns, Inc. Finally was the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bicron. The
holding and reasoning of these cases not only puts Kewanee in context
but also helps explain the structure and content of its reasoning.
With its decision in Lear, the U.S. Supreme Court shocked the
technology licensing community by overturning the well-established
42
doctrine of licensee estoppel.
Although ostensibly a patent
infringement case, Lear involved an effort by an inventor, Adkins, to
enforce a licensing agreement involving trade secret information (i.e.,
information that at the time the license was entered into was
43
confidential and not yet the subject of an issued patent). When Lear
failed to pay the applicable license fee, and after Adkins had obtained
patents on the subject technology, Adkins sued Lear for patent
infringement seeking an award of royalties for Lear’s past and future
use of the licensed technology. At issue was whether Lear’s status as a
licensee of the technology precluded him from arguing that the patents
were invalid.
A little more than five years removed from its decisions in
Sears/Compco, the Court in Lear was quick to identify the conflict
between principles of freedom of contract and federal patent policies
that was presented by the case:
On the one hand, the law of contracts forbids a purchaser to
repudiate his promises simply because he later becomes
dissatisfied with the bargain he has made. On the other hand,
40. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
41. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
42. See, e.g., Note, Licenses—Enforceability—Royalty Provisions in Know-How
Licensing Agreements Held Unenforceable—Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), 84 HARV. L. REV. 477 (1970) and Protecting Trade Secrets, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1971, at F7. Even after nearly forty years, the “shocking” nature of Lear is still being
expressed as evidenced by several of the amicus briefs filed in the recent case of MedImmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007). For instance, in its amicus brief, the ABA
argued that the ruling in Lear should be limited to licensees who expressly repudiate a
license: “The policy of encouraging invalidity challenges does not require that nonrepudiating licensees be allowed to challenge the validity of licensed patents.” Brief for
American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, 127 S. Ct. 764 (No. 05-608), 2006 WL 2091230.
43. The agreement at issue provided that Lear would have the option to terminate the
license agreement if “the U.S. Patent Office refuses to issue a patent . . . or if such a patent so
issued is subsequently held invalid.” Lear, 395 U.S. at 657.
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federal law requires, that all ideas in general circulation be
dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a
44
valid patent.
The question for the Court was whether and how these two
principles could be reconciled. Noting that the intermediate positions
adopted by various courts—i.e., between freedom of contract and
federal patent policy—had been a “failure,” the Court reasoned that
when faced with a choice the policies underlying Sears/Compco should
45
prevail.
Of particular concern to the Court was its belief that the
doctrine of licensee estoppel interfered with the right of members of the
public to freely use information in the public domain, i.e., the
46
information disclosed in the issued patents.
47
Less than a year after Lear, Judge Constance Baker Motley relied
upon the free competition aspects of its reasoning to refuse to enforce
48
the trade secret provisions of a manufacturing agreement.
She
explained:
Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the 1962 contract, Painton agreed to
pay royalties on models for which no patent application had been
or would be made. . . . This court’s enforcement of such an
agreement would be contrary to our national patent law and
policy Lear v. Adkins, supra. Our patent policy of strict
regulation of inventions would be undercut if inventors could
enforce agreements for compensation for alleged secret ideas
without being required to submit those ideas to the Patent
44. Id. at 668, citing Stiffel, 313 F.2d at 115, and Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 311 F.2d at 26.
45. This suggests that when dealing with conflicts between patent law and state law the
“presumption against preemption,” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1974),
does not apply. See discussion of the presumption against preemption in Section IV.A.2.,
infra.
46. Lear, 395 U.S. at 670 (“Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily
when they are balanced against the important public interest in permitting full and free
competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain.”).
47. Judge Motley was the first African-American woman to be appointed as a federal
court judge. She was appointed to the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York by President Lyndon Johnson in 1966, following a distinguished career as a civil
rights lawyer and politician. Among numerous other accomplishments, she wrote the original
complaint in the case of Brown v. Board of Education and was the first African-American
woman to argue a case before the U.S. Supreme Court. Douglas Martin, Constance Baker
Motley, 84, Civil Rights Trailblazer, Lawmaker and Judge, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at
BN.
48. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), citing Lear,
395 U.S. at 672-74.
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Office, and, thereby, eventually have the ideas disclosed to the
49
public.
Even though the subject information was not publicly disclosed, as it
had been in Lear, Judge Motley refused to enforce a license agreement
50
that had been made before the licensor had applied for a patent.
The decisions of the courts in Painton and Lear were greeted with
51
swift and critical rebuke. Within a year after the decision in Painton,
both the Harvard and Texas Law Reviews published comments
52
questioning the reasoning and outcome of the case. These comments
were followed by a law review article by Roger Milgrim entitled Sears to
Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other Matter, in which he expressed
concern that the district court’s decision in Painton was a misguided and
53
unnecessary extension of the Sears/Compco doctrine.
Of particular
concern was the impact the Painton decision would have on existing
54
business practices, including trade secret licensing.
Clearly cognizant of the foregoing criticism, the Second Circuit

49. Id.
50. Painton, 309 F. Supp. at 274.
51. See Roger M. Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and other Matter, 46
N.Y.U. L. REV. 17 (1971); Note, Licenses—Enforceability—Royalty Provisions in Know-How
Licensing Agreements Held Unenforceable.—Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), 84 HARV. L. REV. 477 (1970); Hank Skelton, Note, Patents—A Licensing
Contract for the Manufacture of Un-Patented Devices for Which No Patent Application Has
Been Made is Unenforceable. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), 48 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (1970); and Arnold & Goldstein, Life Under Lear, 48 TEX. L.
REV. 1235, 1254 (1970).
52. See generally Note, Licenses—Enforceability—Royalty Provisions in Know-How
Licensing Agreements Held Unenforceable.—Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), 84 HARV. L. REV. 477 (1970); and Hank Skelton, Note, Patents—A
Licensing Contract for the Manufacture of Un-Patented Devices for Which No Patent
Application Has Been Made is Unenforceable. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp.
271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 48 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (1970). See also Trade Secrets, Interference with
Contracts, and Related Matters, 1971 A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L.
COMMITTEE REP. § 402, at 215 (report of Neil M. Rose, Chairman, Comm. 402) (“Much of
the assigned area of Committee 402 involves the subject of trade secrets which currently falls
under the shadow of the Lear and Painton cases.”).
53. See Milgrim, supra note 51, at 17.
54. Id. at 26-27; Note, Licenses—Enforceability—Royalty Provisions in Know-How
Licensing Agreements Held Unenfoceable.—Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), 84 HARV. L. REV. 477, 480-84; Skelton, supra note 51, at 1399; and Arnold
& Goldstein, Life Under Lear, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1254. For a different perspective in
support of preemption, see generally Note, Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of
Inventions Meeting Judicial Standards of Patentability, 87 HARV. L. REV. 807 (1974).
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Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court in Painton.
After first chastising Judge Motley for reaching a decision “without
benefit of brief or argument from the parties who had been concerned
56
solely with the issue of contract interpretation,” the court examined
the policy issues raised in the lower court’s decision. First, it noted that
unlike Sears/Compco, the licensing of trade secrets does not concern
57
Relying upon a novel
information that is in the public domain.
argument raised in a Harvard Law Review comment, the court then
observed that the licensing of trade secrets actually had the effect of
discouraging the hoarding of information by allowing for the wider
58
distribution and use of trade secret information through licensing.
Next, the court explored whether the availability of trade secret
protection was likely to discourage the filing of patent applications. In
doing so, it introduced a categorical analysis that was later utilized by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Kewanee. The court reasoned that “[i]n
analyzing this argument, it is useful to distinguish three categories—(1)
the trade secret believed by its owner to constitute a validly patentable
invention; (2) the trade secret known to its owner not to be so
patentable; and (3) the trade secret whose valid patentability is
59
considered dubious.”
55. Painton & Co., Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 221-22 (2d Cir. 1971) (“The
portion of the district court’s opinion denying judicial enforcement of agreements for the
licensing of trade secrets at least with respect to which no patent application has been made . .
. has caused widespread concern.”).
56. Painton, 442 F.2d at 221. The tone of the criticism seems to be based in part on a
perception that Judge Motley, as a woman, did not know much about the world of business
and, in my opinion, is overstated.
57. Painton, 442 F.2d at 223.
58. Id., citing Note, Licenses—Enforceability—Royalty Provisions in Know-How
Licensing Agreements Held Unenfoceable—Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), 84 HARV. L. REV. at 484 (“Rather than having a monopolistic tendency, like
the Illinois law involved in Sears and Compco, the upholding of private agreements for the
sharing of trade secrets on mutually acceptable terms tends against the owner's hoarding
them.”).As discussed in Section IV., infra, there is a difference between licensing practices
that reduce the “monopolistic tendencies” of trade secret law and licensing practices that are
equivalent to the disclosure purposes of patent law. The Kewanee court conflated the two
concepts.
59. Painton, 442 F.2d at 224. Note, however, that the ordering of the categories is
different from the order presented in Kewanee. See Section II.A., infra. The first category in
Painton (clearly patentable) is Category 3 in the Kewanee analysis. Id. The second category
(clearly not patentable) is also Category 2 in the Kewanee analysis. Id. The third category
(questionable patentability) is Category 1 in the Kewanee analysis. Id. The Painton and
Kewanee courts also differed in their identification of the category of most concern. For the
Kewanee court it was the clearly patentable invention, and for the Painton court it was the
invention of questionable patentability. Id.
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The court viewed the first category as presenting little risk of
diversion away from patent protection because a licensor could exact
more money from the licensing of patented technology and because of
60
the risk that trade secrets would be lost. The court explained:
any conflict between patent policy and trade secret agreements . .
. is readily resolved not by refusing to enforce a trade secret
agreement but rather by refusing to grant or uphold a patent
when the inventor has unduly delayed his application after the
61
invention has been put to use.
In other words, the potential conflict between patent and trade
secret law is diminished as much by the strict requirements of patent law
62
as it is by the scope and requirements of trade secret law.
If the

60. Painton, 442 F.2d at 224.
61. Id. This argument refers to the “public use” and “on sale” bars to patent
protection that are set forth in section 102(b) of the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). An
inventor is barred from obtaining a patent on her invention if it was in public use or on sale
for more than one year prior to the filing of a patent application. As explained by the court
in Painton, “‘[p]ublic use or sale’ may be found even though the inventor has contracted for
secrecy by a user or . . . has practiced the invention solely for his own purposes.” Painton, 442
F.2d at 224, n. 6, citing Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 18 (1829) and Metallizing
Eng’g. Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946). See also TunJen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 39, 70-71
(2008) (an inventor who files a patent application will have priority over a trade secret holder
even if the trade secret holder was the first to conceive the invention. This creates a situation
where the trade secret holder will lose both the trade secret protection and will also be
excluded from patenting the trade secret); Bruce T. Atkins, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1151, 117475 (1996) (a trade secret with patentable subject matter can become technically unpatentable
due to public use, demonstration, or commercial exploitation more than one year prior to the
date of application); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (“As between a prior inventor who benefits from a process by selling its product
but suppresses, conceals, or otherwise keeps the process from the public, and a later inventor
who promptly files a patent application . . . the law favors the latter.”).
62. According to an amicus brief that was filed in Kewanee by the National Patent
Council in 1974, only twenty-eight percent of patents were held valid when challenged. Brief
for National Patent Council, Inc., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 1973 WL 173805 (U.S.)
(1973), p.1. See also GLORIA K. KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS 4-41, n. 35.2 (rev. ed. 1980) (finding patents were only held valid
thirty-five percent of the time according to 1953-1977 data); and P.J. Federico, Adjudicated
Patents, 1948-54, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 233, 236 (1956) (finding that only 30-40% of patents
were held valid in cases where validity was in issue according to data from 1948-1954).
Today, this number is much higher, suggesting that the “strict requirements of patent law”
may not be applied as strictly today as they once were. See John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205
(1998) (Professor Allison and Professor Lemley concluded that forty-six percent of litigated
patents were held invalid). See also Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year
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“secret” use of an invention results, after a year, in the inventor’s
inability to obtain a patent, the court reasoned that such inventor would
63
choose the patent route. This, of course, assumes that the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the courts will apply the
64
“stringent” requirements of patent law correctly. It also means that if
the ability of an inventor to delay the filing of a patent application has
become easier since 1974, there is a greater potential for conflict
65
between patent and trade secret law.
Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 420 (1994).
63. See generally Painton, 442 F.2d at 216, citing Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
1, 18 (1829) (“‘Public use or sale’ may be found even though the inventor has contracted for
secrecy by a user or, for that matter, has practiced the invention solely for his own
purposes.”). This point was made in greater detail in a contemporaneous law review article
by Gordon L. Doerfer. Gordon L. Doerfer, The Limits of Trade Secret Law Imposed By
Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1432, 1441 (1967). As noted
therein, theoretically, the “secret” use of an invention puts an inventor at risk of: (1) waiving
her right to obtain a patent on the invention and (2) being able to claim the position of “firstto-invent.” Id.
64. Compare early cases defining “public use,” (e.g., Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. 120, 125
(1873) (the invention accessible to public and therefore anticipated as prior use); cf. Gayle v.
Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 497-98 (1850) (invention not accessible and therefore not anticipated as
prior art); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1952) (the Reviser’s Notes to the 1952
Patent Act state that “[t]he interpretation by the courts of Section102(a) as being more
restricted than the actual language would suggest (for example ‘known’ has been held to
mean ‘publicly known’) is recognized but no change in the language is made at this time.”);
and Connecticut Valley Enters., Inc. v. U.S., 348 F.2d 949, 952 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (stating that
“prior knowledge or use in order to negative novelty must also be accessible to the public.”))
with post-1974 cases (e.g., Full Mold Process, Inc. v. Cent. Iron Foundry Co., 489 F. Supp.
893, 900 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (stating that “courts have, at various times, inferred that the . . .
use must be at least minimally accessible to the public. . . . [and] at its most restrictive, a
requirement that no affirmative steps were taken to conceal the prior use.”); Akzo N.V. v.
U.S. Intern. Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 (1986) (“prior art reference must be
enabling . . . .”); Cont’l Can Co. U.S.A. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(no Section 102(b) “on-sale” bar when a device was “part of a terminated development
project that never bore commercial fruit and was cloaked in confidentiality.”); AMP Inc. v.
Fujitsu Microelecs., Inc., 853 F. Supp. 808, 816-17 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (ideas mentioned in
presentation to various companies did not invoke the public use bar; “those who attended the
presentations were under an obligation of confidence.”); Nordberg Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 881
F. Supp. 1252, 1284, 1293 (E.D. Wis. 1995), aff’d, 82 F.3d 394 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating “use or
sale ceases to be experimental when the motivation is to exploit the invention and gain a
competitive advantage over others.”); but see 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §
3.05[2] (1998) (explaining generally that “anticipating prior use must be accessible to the
public. A use under conditions of secrecy is not sufficient.”)). See also cases that state that
the secret or purely private use of an invention does not constitute a public use and does not
trigger the one-year deadline to file a patent application (e.g., Root v. Third Ave. R. Co., 146
U.S. 210 (1892); Nomadic Structures, Inc. v. Portable Exhibit Factory, Inc., 224 U.S.P.Q. 937
(C.D. Cal. 1984); and Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc. 303 F. 3d 1294 (Fed. Cir.
2002)).
65. See discussion of post-1974 changes in patent law in Section III.A., infra. See also
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As to the second category, the court expressed concern that denying
trade secret protection would lead to the Patent Office being flooded
66
with applications for unpatentable inventions. Without trade secret
protection, the court feared that innovators would choose to pursue
patent protection even though it was clearly not available. The third
67
category presented the greatest concern to the Painton court.
However, in the absence of empirical evidence, the court was unwilling
to assume that a diversion from patent to trade secret protection would
68
occur or to disrupt the licensing practices of industry.
For over two years following the Second Circuit’s decision in
Painton, the practicing bar operated under the assumption that trade
secret law could co-exist with patent law. That all changed in May of
69
1973, when the Sixth Circuit rendered its decision in Bicron. Although
the district court had refused to find that trade secret law was
preempted by patent law, the court of appeals reversed and in so doing
70
explicitly rejected the reasoning of Painton and similar cases.
James R. Barney, The Prior User Defense: A Reprieve for Trade Secret Owners Or a Disaster
for the Patent Law?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 261 (2000) (arguing that the
adoption by Congress of Section 273 of the Patent Act to create a “prior user defense” for the
alleged infringement of methods of doing business reduced the incentives for certain
companies to obtain patent protection and thereby diminished the public domain.).
66. Painton, 442 F.2d at 224 (“There can be no public interest in stimulating developers
of such know-how to flood an overburdened Patent Office with applications or what they do
not consider patentable.”).
67. Id. at 225 (“Since a rule invalidating the licensing or sale of know-how is not
needed to promote patent applications in the first category and in the second would not
promote any valuable ones and would be actually detrimental to the public interest, any case
for such a rule must hinge on the third category—where the inventor is doubtful whether he
can get a patent or, at least, a valid one.”). While this category was of some concern to the
Kewanee court, it was not the category of its greatest concern. It was most concerned with
the first category discussed by the court in Painton, i.e., the case of validly patentable
inventions. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
68. Painton, 442 F.2d at 225-26 (“The district judge cited no data to prove that
licensing of trade secrets had worked adversely to the public interest. To the contrary, such
facts as have been brought to our notice indicate that the sharing of technological know-how
on the basis of proper agreements has been beneficial not only within this country but in its
relations with others.”). Although not identified by the court as such, this is further evidence
of the application of the “presumption against preemption.” See supra note 45.
69. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. et al., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973)
70. Id. at 1086-87 (1972) (“We recognize that our holding in this case is in conflict with
the previously cited decisions of other Circuits, Servo Corp. of Am. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 337
F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. den. 383 U.S. 934, 15 L. Ed. 2d 851, 86 S. Ct. 1061 (1966),
rehearing denied 384 U.S. 914, 16 L. Ed. 2d 366, 86 S. Ct. 1333 (1966); Dekar Indus., Inc. v.
Bissett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 402 U.S. 945, 91 S. Ct. 1621, 29
L. Ed. 2d 113 (1971); Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969);
Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971), but our analysis of the relationship
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Significantly, unlike the court in Painton, the court in Bicron did not
engage in a tripartite analysis based upon the hypothetical patentability
of trade secret information.
Rather, the court found that the
information at issue in the case was patentable and that to protect it
71
under trade secret law would interfere with federal patent policy. The
question for the court was “[w]hether a state trade secret law which
protects an invention which would be an appropriate subject for a
patent under the Patent Laws of the United States, and which has been
used commercially for more than one year, conflicts with [federal patent
72
policies].” By finding a conflict, the court limited the period of time in
which trade secrets licenses could be enforced to the period ending one
73
year after the trade secrets were first disclosed to a licensee.
With the conflicting decisions and reasoning of Bicron and Painton,
the circumstances were ripe for review by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Although the issue facing the Court was framed as a question of federal
preemption, the broader question was how to reconcile the desire of
states to prevent unfair competition and protect trade secrets with the
strong public policy favoring free competition. Unfortunately, instead of
addressing this broader issue, as it had done in the Sears/Compco cases,
the Court’s analysis in Kewanee focused on the arguments that were
raised by the parties and in the amici briefs and failed to directly
consider how the availability of overlapping forms of state and federal
protection might adversely effect competition. In other words, the

between the Patent Laws of the United States and the Trade Secret Laws of the State of
Ohio, as applied in this case, forces us to the conclusion that the field of protection afforded to
this plaintiff by that Trade Secret Law has been preempted by the Patent Laws of the United
States.”) (Emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is the court whose decisions
were reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Sears/Compco cases. In the Sears/Compco
cases, the Sixth Circuit was chastised by the U.S. Supreme Court for not finding preemption.
In Kewanee, they were careful to fully consider whether trade secret law interfered with the
policies of patent law and were found wrong again. In light of this, it is important to
understand how the facts and underlying state law of Sears/Compco differ from those in
Kewanee. The differences are discussed in Section II, infra.
71. Bicron, 478 F.2d at 1086.
72. Id. at 1078.
73. According to U.S. patent law, an inventor will lose her patent rights if she does not
file a patent application within one year of the first public use or sale of the invention. 35
U.S.C. § 102(b). Apparently, the Court of Appeals in Bicron felt that such date should mark
the maximum length of trade secret protection as well. Bicron, 478 F.2d at 1078. What the
court did not recognize is that the public use or sale necessary to trigger the one year deadline
for filing a patent application may not amount to the destruction of trade secret rights. See
Metallizing Eng’g. Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (1946), cert. den.
328 U.S. 840. See also note 61, supra. This is a point that was emphasized by the Petitioner
(Kewanee) in its brief to the Supreme Court.
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Kewanee Court seems to have “missed the forest for the trees;” it was so
focused on applying a traditional preemption anlaysis that it failed to
recognize the need for a special approach to preemption issues when
intellectual property rights are involved (What is referred to herein and
elsewhere as “IP Preemption.”).
II. KEWANEE DE-CONSTRUCTED
By the time the members of the Supreme Court began to
contemplate the conflicting decisions and reasoning of Bicron and
Painton, they had been presented with varying versions of the harm that
would result from their decision. In one version, the petitioner
(Kewanee) and several amici stressed the limited nature of trade secret
law and lamented the horrible business environment that would result if
74
states were not allowed to police unethical commercial behavior. The
respondent (Bicron) emphasized the disclosure benefits of U.S. patent
law and argued that to recognize trade secret law, particularly with
respect to information that falls within the scope of patentable subject
75
matter, would unduly restrict the free flow of ideas.
Other
commentators, like Roger Milgrim, told a story of the harm that would
befall domestic industry and small businesses if they were not allowed to
76
To complicate matters
license their inventions as trade secrets.
further, then Solicitor General Robert Bork argued that to allow trade
secret protection would in some situations be contrary to the strong
policy of free competition while in other cases it would promote
77
The challenge for the Court was to reconcile these
competition.
competing views.
Rather than attempting to articulate a test for IP preemption that is

74. Brief of the Petitioner, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), 1973
WL 172411; Brief of Amicus Curiae Manufacturing Chemists Assoc’n, Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron, Corp., 1973 WL 172414; Brief of the Ohio State Bar Assoc’n as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, Corp., 1973 WL 172424.
75. See Brief of the Respondents, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, Corp., 1973 WL 172412;
Brief of Amicus Curiae National Patent Council, Inc. for Itself and Representing National
Small Business Association, Inc., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, Corp., 1973 WL 173805. See
also Note, Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of Inventions Meeting Judicial
Standards of Patentability, 87 HARV. L. REV. 807 (1974).
76. See Milgrim, supra note 51; O’MEARA, HOW SMALLER COMPANIES PROTECT
THEIR TRADE SECRETS, supra note 33. But see Brief of Amicus Curiae National Patent
Council, Inc. for Itself and Representing National Small Business Association, Inc., Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron, Corp., 1973 WL 173805.
77. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, Corp.,
1974 WL 185610.
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based upon
principles of intellectual property law, the Court
approached its task by addressing, seriatim, the arguments that were
raised by the parties, the amici, and commentators.
A. Argument One: The Limited Scope of Trade Secret Law
The Court’s analysis begins with a discussion of trade secret law as it
was interpreted and applied by the State of Ohio. Based upon the
language and structure of the Court’s analysis of Ohio law, the Court
was undoubtedly influenced by the amicus brief filed by the Ohio State
Bar Association (hereinafter “Bar Association”). In that brief, the Bar
Association repeatedly emphasized the narrow scope of Ohio’s trade
78
secret law. Summarizing the requirements of Ohio law, it identified
three fundamental requirements for the protection of trade secrets:
(1) the trade secret, whether patentable or not, must constitute
proper matter for protection; (2) the person against whom relief
is sought must have either violated or threatened to violate a
contract or confidence not to disclose of use the secret; and (3)
the matters for which protection is sought must be shown to be a
79
secret.
The Bar Association also noted that Ohio law “provides a trade
secret holder with a cause of action only against those who obtain his
trade secrets through improper means or where the use is in violation of
a confident [sic] relationship, and then, only so long as the trade secrets
80
remain secret.”
Picking up on the theme of the Bar Association’s brief, the Kewanee
court emphasized that for information to be protected by trade secret
law it “must be secret, and must not be of public knowledge or of a
81
general knowledge in the trade or business.” The Court also noted
that although “[t]he subject of a trade secret must be secret,” secrecy is
not lost if the trade secret information is revealed “‘in confidence, and

78. Brief of the Ohio State Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, Corp., 1973 WL 172424, 4-8.
79. Id. at 6.
80. Id. at 11. The Bar Association also stated, “Ohio trade secret law does not prohibit
or exclude lair [sic, meant “fair”] competition, prohibit use of a trade secret by he who
legitimately discovers of obtains it, or protect ideas in the public domain as did the state laws
in Sears, Compco and Lear. . . .” Id.
81. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475, citing B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99
(Ohio App. 1963) and Nat’l Tube Co. v. Eastern Tube Co., 70 N.E. 1127 (Ohio 1903).
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under an implied obligation not to use or disclose it.’” It recognized
that there are two types of wrongs that trade secret law seeks to prevent:
(1) the disclosure or use of a trade secret by one who is “under the
83
express or implied restriction of nondisclosure or nonuse,” and (2) the
disclosure or use of a trade secret after it has been obtained by
“improper means,” including theft, wiretapping, and aerial
84
Lastly, the Court emphasized that trade secret
reconnaissance.
protection is limited by the fact that it “does not offer protection against
discovery by fair and honest means, such as by independent invention,
85
accidental disclosure, or by so-called reverse engineering.”
B. Argument Two: Constitutional Preemption
The Court next turned its attention to the question of federal
preemption by first considering the possibility of Constitutional
86
preemption. As succinctly described in a later case involving a state
tax law, the question under this type of preemption is whether all or
87
some of Congress’s Article I powers are exclusive. Specifically with
reference to the issues addressed in Kewanee: Does the power conferred
on Congress by Art. I, section 8, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution
preclude states from adopting laws that also are intended to promote
the arts and sciences?
Based upon the reasoning of its 1972 decision in Goldstein v.
California, the Court quickly dispensed with the argument that
88
Constitutional preemption applied to preclude state trade secret laws.
Noting what the Kewanee Court described as “the great diversity of
interests in the Nation—the essentially non-uniform character of the
appreciation of intellectual achievements in the various States,” the
Court in Goldstein ruled that states could enact laws to protect content
82. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 476.
These two types of wrongs comprise the definition of
“misappropriation” under the UTSA. Clearly, the drafters of the UTSA had this statement
from Kewanee in mind when, in 1975, they renewed their efforts to adopt a Uniform Trade
Secrets Act. See March 1976 version of draft Uniform Trade Secrets Act as proposed by the
PTC Section (definition of “misappropriation” still in its formative stages) and compare to
the language of “misappropriation” that is contained in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as
adopted.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 478-79.
87. See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 261, 263 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
88. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 478-79.
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89

left unprotected by U.S. copyright law. The Court applied the same
reasoning in Kewanee when it observed, “just as States may exercise
regulatory power over writings so may the States regulate with respect
90
to discoveries.” The only limitation on this power is that the operation
91
of state laws cannot conflict with the operation of federal law.
C. Argument Three: Conflict Preemption
To determine whether state trade secret law conflicted with the
operation of federal law, the Court turned its attention to the possibility
92
of Supremacy Clause preemption. After first noting that the Patent
Act does not contain an express preemption provision, the Court
ignored the possibility of field preemption and focused its attention on
93
The essential question was
the doctrine of conflict preemption.
whether state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and

89. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973) (holding that because U.S.
copyright law did not (then) protect sound recordings, California was free to enact state laws
to protect such content). Arguably, in light of international agreements that attempt to
harmonize intellectual property laws, most notably the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), to which all members of the World Trade Organization are
subject, the “non-uniform character of the appreciation of intellectual achievements in the
various States” has greatly diminished since 1973. See id.
90. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479.
91. Id.
92. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The basic question under the doctrine of Supremacy
Clause preemption is whether a federal law, being the “supreme law of the land,” precludes
the adoption of a similar state law. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
To answer this question, the Court has devised a number of tests, which, unfortunately, are
not always clearly identified or defined in its preemption jurisprudence. See infra Section IV.
93. As the Supreme Court has explained:
Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and “is compelled whether
Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose.” [Citations omitted.] Absent explicit preemptive language, we have recognized at least two types of implied pre-emption:
field pre-emption, where the scheme of federal regulation is “‘so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it,’” [citation omitted] and conflict pre-emption, where “compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” [citation omitted]
or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” [Citations omitted].
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992), citing Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983); Fidelity
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230; Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138
(1988); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971).
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execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress?”
To determine whether Ohio’s trade secret law stood as an obstacle
to the accomplishment of federal patent policies, the Court compared
the objectives of patent law with the objectives of trade secret law. Not
surprisingly, the Court identified the goal of encouraging innovation as
the traditional and primary objective of U.S. patent law and the
enhancement of “the general store of knowledge” as another important
95
Consistent with long-standing trade secret
goal of patent law.
doctrine, the maintenance of commercial ethics was identified as the
96
primary objective of trade secret laws. However, in an obvious effort
to better align the objectives of patent law with the objectives of trade
secret law, the Court also noted that trade secret laws encourage
innovation by allowing innovators to protect inventions that may not be
97
patentable. The Court concluded that trade secret law did not conflict
with the primary objective of patent law because there was nothing
98
wrong with having multiple forms of incentives.
While stretching to align the objectives of trade secret law with the
objectives of patent law, the Court seemed to go out of its way to
distinguish the types of information that are protected from trade secret
law from the types of information that could be patented, thereby
99
reducing the possibility of field preemption.
First, it noted the
“rigorous” requirements for patent protection, including novelty,
usefulness, and non-obviousness, suggesting in the process that not
100
many patents are issued. It also described what it perceived to be the
101
While
limited set of inventions to which patent law applies.
94. Kewanee, 416 U. S. at 479, citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
95. Kewanee, 416 U. S. at 480-81. The latter objective was an obvious ode to the
arguments that were made by Respondent. See Brief of Respondents, Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron, Corp., 1973 WL 172412 (U.S.), at 12.
96. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481-82.
97. Id. at 485.
98. Id. at 484.
99. See infra Section IV. for a detailed explanation of the Supreme Court’s preemption
jurisprudence, including so-called “field preemption.” Apparently, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Kewanee didn’t directly address the question of field preemption because of Congress’ silence
on the issue of preemption when it substantially revised the Patent Act in 1952. Kewanee, 416
U.S. at 493 (“Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen the wisdom of allowing
the States to enforce trade secret protection. Until Congress takes affirmative action to the
contrary, States should be free to grant protection to trade secrets.”) See also, Brief Amicus
Curiae of the American Bar Association, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, Corp., 1973 WL 172420,
7-8.
100. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476, citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
101. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476.
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acknowledging that trade secret law protected many inventions before
they were patented, the Court nonetheless characterized the typical
102
In
trade secret as something less valuable than a true invention.
particular, it noted that U.S. patent law—at least at the time of
Kewanee—did not protect “customer lists,” “advertising campaigns,”
103
Although the Court acknowledged that
and “business methods.”
there was bound to be some overlap between information that was
protected by trade secret law and information that could be patented, it
104
Thus, consistent with its
suggested that the overlap was minimal.
decision in Goldstein, the Court saw no difficulty with states regulating
105
in an area “left unattended by Congress.”
The fact that the Kewanee Court was careful to distinguish the scope
of patent and trade secret law and invoke the language of Goldstein is
not surprising given the Court’s obvious desire to preserve state trade
secret laws. However, when confronted with the argument made in
Goldstein that the Sears/Compco doctrine applied to preempt a criminal
statute that made it a crime to copy sound recordings, the Court
explained:
The standards established for granting federal patent protection
to machines thus indicated not only which articles in this
particular category Congress wished to protect, but which
configurations it wished to remain free. The application of state
law in these cases to prevent the copying of articles which did not
meet the requirements for federal protection disturbed the
careful balance which Congress had drawn, and thereby
necessarily gave way under the Supremacy Clause of the
106
Constitution.
Although the foregoing statement is dicta, it clearly highlights the
Court’s belief that inventions that do not meet the standards for
patentability should be free for anyone to use. Underlying such a
concern, however, was an assumption that the non-patentable
information would be in the public domain as it was in the
Sears/Compco cases. The Kewanee case presented a new twist on an old
102. Id. at 482 (“trade secret law protects items which would not be proper subjects for
consideration for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. §101.”).
103. Id. at 483.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 482-83.
106. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 569-570.
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question: Does federal patent law preempt state laws that are designed
to protect information that, by definition, is not yet in the public
domain?
While the non-public nature of trade secret information served to
distinguish the facts of Kewanee from the facts of the Sears/Compco
cases, it threatened to interfere with the disclosure goals of patent law.
As was explained in a 1967 law review article that was cited both by the
court of appeals in Bicron and the Supreme Court in Kewanee, “[s]ince
trade secret law discourages disclosure and enables an innovator to limit
the circulation of his new ideas, a conflict between trade secret law and
107
patent law is suggested.” It was here where the Court saw the biggest
108
potential for conflict between patent law and trade secret law.
The author of the aforementioned article chose to deal with the
apparent conflict between the disclosure purposes of patent law and the
secrecy requirements of state trade secret law by arguing that the
109
The Supreme
asserted patent policy of disclosure was overstated.
Court in Kewanee took the opposite approach.
Rather than
downplaying the disclosure function of patent law, the Court stretched
the purpose of trade secret law to include the dissemination of
110
knowledge. Following the lead of Judge Friendly in the Painton case,
the Court then divided its analysis of the potential conflict between the

107. Doerfer, supra note 63, at 1441. See also Brief of the United States as Amicus
Curiae, supra note 11, at 16-17 (arguing for so called “partial preemption” of trade secret
protection for patentable inventions and noting that the patent policy of disclosure would be
undermined without such preemption). See also Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 485, and Bicron, 478
F.2d at 1082.
108. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484. See also Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref.
Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (noting that the quid pro quo for patent protection is “disclosure
of a process or device in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the art to practice the
invention once the period of the monopoly has expired”). But see Note, The Disclosure
Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2028 (2005)
(arguing that disclosure is an elusive goal of the U.S. patent system).
109. Doerfer, supra note 63, at 1444 (“At least at the present stage, the policy of
disclosure seems insufficiently developed to require that trade secret law be scrapped merely
on the ground that it encourages nondisclosure. Indeed, the method in which the statute is
administered seems to be quite compatible with the nondisclosure aims of trade secret law.
The reluctance to require detailed specifications may be one example. Another is the
requirement that patent applications be held in confidence.”). See also Note, The Disclosure
Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007 (2005) (providing a
more recent challenge to the asserted disclosure purpose of patent law).
110. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 482, 485-86, citing Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 435
(Sp. Ct. of Penn. 1960) (describing a disclosure function of trade secret law and noting that
“the optimum amount of ‘entrusting’ will not occur unless the risk of loss to the businessman
through a breach of trust can be held to a minimum.”).
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disclosure purposes of patent law and state trade secret laws into three
111
First, the Court considered the case of trade secrets that are
parts.
within the scope of patentable subject matter but are clearly not
patentable, e.g., because they are not new, useful, or non-obvious
112
Second, it considered the case of the
(hereinafter Category One).
invention of uncertain patentability (hereinafter Category Two).
Finally, it considered the case of the patentable invention (hereinafter
Category Three).
With respect to Category One, the Court saw no inconsistency with
113
providing inventors with another (albeit weaker) form of protection.
The Court further opined that abolition of trade secret protection for
clearly unpatentable inventions would actually result in more hoarding
114
Moreover, it expressed concern that
and less sharing of information.
abolition of trade secret protection would put small companies at a
disadvantage by making it difficult to effectively license their
115
innovations.
Category 1 of the Court’s analysis assumes that the patent
requirements of novelty, usefulness, and non-obviousness can be clearly
determined so that an inventor would choose trade secret protection
over patent protection because she was certain patent protection was
impossible. The more likely scenario is that the owner of information
would not be certain about its patentability. With respect to this
category of inventions (Category 2), the Court expressed skepticism that
an innovator would choose to pursue trade secret protection even if

111. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484.
112. Id. at 484-86.
113. Id. at 485, citing Doerfer, supra note 63 (“Trade secret law will encourage
invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the independent
innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention.”).
114. Id. at 486, citing Painton, 442 F.2d at 223. Apparently, the genesis of this
argument was a 1970 note in the Harvard Law Review article that criticized the district court’s
decision in Painton. See Note, supra note 42, at 482 (“Perhaps the most important argument
in opposition to Painton is that an effective prohibition of know-how licensing would run
counter to the policy in favor of dissemination of information. If an inventor whose discovery
is not patentable is prevented from licensing for royalties, he will have no reason to divulge
his know-how. In the case of inventors who do not engage in activities enabling them to use
the know-how themselves (“non-manufacturing inventors”), the result would substantially
deter research and development, contrary to patent policy.”).
115. Like most of the factual assumptions that were relied upon in Kewanee, the
observation is unsupported by any evidence. In fact what studies did exist at the time were
inconclusive on the issue. O’MEARA supra note 33, at 44 (“widely varying opinions are
voiced by the 56 survey cooperators” on the question of whether smaller companies are at a
disadvantage in protecting trade secrets).
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patent protection was questionable.
However, in the event that the
innovator chose trade secret protection, the Court reasoned that the
existence of trade secret law allowed for the more efficient exploitation
of discoveries by encouraging innovators to share their inventions
without delay (i.e., before they knew whether a patent would be
117
issued). It also noted that, without trade secret protection, there was a
greater likelihood that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office would be
118
burdened with applications that were “doomed to be turned down.”
Thus, the Court reasoned that there was a greater potential of harm to
society and patent policy if trade secret law was abolished than if it was
119
preserved.
Finally, the Court confronted what it believed was the most difficult
scenario: the trade secret that is within patentable subject matter and
clearly patentable (Category 3).
If a State, through a system of protection, were to cause a
substantial risk that holders of patentable inventions would not
seek patents, but rather would rely on the state protection, we
would be compelled to hold that such a system could not
120
constitutionally continue to exist.
The Court reasoned that there was “remote” risk that holders of
patentable inventions would choose trade secret protection because
trade secret law provides far weaker protection than patent
121
As the Court explained, “[w]here patent law acts as a
protection.
122
barrier, trade secret law functions relatively as a sieve.” In the Court’s
116. Kewanee, 416 U. S. at 487-88. This argument appears to be taken directly from a
Note regarding the Painton case that appeared in the Harvard Law Review. Note, supra note
42, at 480-81. Like other factual assumptions upon which the Court relied, the argument is
not supported by any evidence. See supra note 115.
117. Id. at 487-88. This argument is apparently based upon an assumption that
innovators who choose to pursue patent protection would not license their inventions during
the pendency of their patent applications. There is, however, no rule of patent law that
precludes the licensing of inventions while a patent application is pending.
118. Id. at 487. This is the same concern that the Painton court expressed with respect
to the same category of innovations. See supra note 66.
119. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 489-90. In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall disagreed with this
conclusion and, instead, based his concurrence on his belief that there was no actual conflict
between what he called “the two schemes of regulation” and no evidence of Congressional
intent to preempt the field. Id. at 494-495.
122. Id. at 490.
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mind, the threat that an invention that was maintained as a trade secret
might be discovered by someone else would encourage most inventors
123
With respect to the rare inventor who
to seek patent protection.
would forego certain patent protection in favor of trade secret
protection, the Court opined that scientific and technological progress
would not be impeded by the resulting lack of disclosure because of
what it identified as the “ripeness-of-time concept of invention,” i.e., the
theory that inventions that are discovered by one person will soon be
124
discovered by another.
D. Argument Four: The Partial Preemption Theory
Having determined that the primary and secondary objectives of
trade secret law did not clash with federal patent policies, the Court
turned its attention to addressing the so-called “partial preemption”
125
The Court was not confronted
arguments of Solicitor General Bork.
with a state statute that sought to protect content left wholly
unprotected by federal law like it had been in Goldstein. Nor was it
confronted with a state statute, like that involved in Sears/Compco,
which purported to protect content that was clearly in the public
domain. Instead, because the Court chose not to apply the fact-specific
analysis employed by the court of appeals in Bicron, it was confronted
with the abstract question whether a state law that protected
information that could fall both within and without the scope of
patentable subject matter was preempted by federal law.
In his brief on behalf of the United States, Solicitor General Bork
126
generally argued that state trade secret law should not be preempted.
However, he asserted three refinements to that general proposition, all
of which would require an examination of the particular facts of a case.
First, he noted that there “was a view within the government” that
123. Id.
124. Id. at 490-91. This concept is also known as the theory of multiple independent
discoveries. Apparently, as of 1974, there was a fairly well-developed literature on the topic.
See Eugene Garfield, Current Comments: Multiple Independent Discovery & Creativity in
Science, 44 CURRENT CONTENTS 5 (Nov. 3 1980), reprinted in 4 ESSAYS OF AN
INFORMATION SCIENTIST 660 (1980) (describing the debate and the literature). Of particular
significance is a 1974 study by William Hagstrom in which he surveyed 1718 research
scientists, 46.2% of whom stated that their inventions had been anticipated once or twice.
William O. Hagstrom, Competition in Science, 39 AMER. SOCIOL. REV. 1 (1974). Arguably,
this concept is built into trade secret law by virtue of the rule that trade secret law does not
preclude independent discovery or reverse engineering.
125. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 491-92.
126. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 77, at 5-6.
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federal patent law does preempt state trade secret law when it seeks to
127
protect patentable inventions. Emphasizing the disclosure purpose of
patent law, he noted that “[s]ince election by inventors to rely on trade
secret law reduces disclosure by diverting inventions away from the
patent system, technological progress is slowed, contrary to the goal of
128
Under this argument, trade secret protection
federal patent policy.”
for inventions that are clearly patentable should be preempted, with the
proviso that such inventions could be protected as trade secrets during
129
the preparation and pendency of the patent application.
The second qualification concerned secrets that are unpatentable,
not because they fall outside the scope of patentable subject matter, but
because they do not meet the novelty and non-obviousness
130
In essence, and without reference to the
requirements of patent law.
specific details of Ohio law, Solicitor General Bork argued that state
trade secret law should be preempted to the extent it seeks to protect
technology that is not novel, i.e., technology that is “in the public
131
Inventions that were unpatentable because of obviousness
domain.”
132
would be less likely to be preempted.
The third qualification urged by Solicitor General Bork concerned
the scope and length of trade secret injunctions. Consistent with the
fact-specific nature of his earlier arguments, he noted that perpetual
injunctions “come [very close to a grant of patent protection for the
133
secret”] and, therefore, intrude too much on federal patent policy.
This is because injunctions that last past the date when trade secrecy is
lost are, in effect, providing state law protection for information that is
in the public domain.
In response to the arguments of Solicitor General Bork, the Court
first relied upon its earlier conclusion that trade secret law does not
134
conflict with the federal policy favoring disclosure.
Secondarily, it
expressed concern that partial preemption would impose an impossible
135
administrative burden on state courts.
Focusing only on the first
127. Id. at 13.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 21-23.
130. Id. at 24-25.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. See also Adelman, Secrecy & Patenting: Proposals for Resolving Conflict, 1
AM. PATENT LAW ASS’N Q. 295 (1973).
134. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 491-92.
135. Id. at 492.

2008]

KEWANEE REVISITED

327

qualification, the Court said that it did not want to put state courts in
136
the difficult position of having to judge the patentability of inventions.
The Court did not directly address the additional arguments: (1) that
state trade secret law is preempted to the extent that it seeks to protect
content in the public domain; and (2) that perpetual injunctions are
137
improper.
E. The Missing Analyses: Field Preemption and Free Competition
Without any empirical evidence to support its conclusions, it is
clear that the approach of the Court in Kewanee was highly influenced
by a number of law review articles, the amici briefs that were filed, and
by a general fear that to rule otherwise would disrupt the licensing
138
practices of numerous businesses.
Interestingly, although just a year
earlier the Court suggested in Goldstein that federal patent law “so
occupied the field” that the doctrine of field preemption would apply to
139
preclude state regulation of patentable and unpatentable inventions, it
140
failed in Kewanee to directly address the question of field preemption.
As discussed in Section IV infra, it also failed to discuss the free
competition concerns that are at the heart of the Sears/Compco doctrine
141
and the Court’s subsequent decision in Bonito Boats.
III. THE CHANGED ASSUMPTIONS OF KEWANEE
As the foregoing indicates, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Kewanee
is highly dependent upon factual assumptions and the Court’s
understanding of the applicable scope of patent, copyright, and trade
secret law. To the extent such assumptions and laws have changed, the
reasoning underlying Kewanee must change as well or, at the very least,
be re-examined. The following is an overview of the relevant changes to
136. Id.
137. Arguably, these arguments were indirectly addressed when the Court described
the limited scope of Ohio’s trade secret law. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 474-76.
138. See, e.g., the Amicus brief of the Manufacturing Chemists Association in which it
is argued, “Because the opinion below applies to anything and everything falling within the
‘subject matter’ jurisdiction of the patent laws, it would, if affirmed, apply to every advance in
the extensive field of technology and thus, in effect, jeopardize the value of all secret
technological information.” Brief of Amicus Curiae Manufacturing Chemists Association,
supra note 11, at 17.
139. Goldstein, 42 U.S. at 569-570.
140. See supra note 99.
141. The Court’s discussion of the disclosure aspects of trade secret law have the seeds
of a free competition argument, but a state’s interest in promoting free competition is never
explicitly mentioned.
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patent, copyright, and trade secret law that have occurred since 1974.
The significance of these changes on the outcome and reasoning of
Kewanee is discussed in Section IV, infra.
A. Changes to Patent Law since 1974.
The most significant change in patent law to occur since 1974 is the
142
broadening of the scope of patentable subject matter.
In Kewanee,
the Supreme Court relied heavily upon its understanding that patent
protection was not available for advertising schemes and business
143
methods. This is no longer the case. Although the wording of Section
101 of the Patent Act has not changed since 1974, the interpretation and
144
application of that provision has changed dramatically. At the time of
Kewanee, a number of judicially created doctrines existed to preclude
the patentability of life forms, business methods, and computer
145
Due to post-1974 developments, including the Supreme
software.
Court’s decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, these doctrines no longer
146
apply. Instead, as artfully stated in Chakrabarty, an inventor can seek
147
a patent for “anything under the sun that is made by man.”
Another important change in patent law since 1974 occurred to the
142. For a detailed explanation of these changes, see Brieanna Dolmage, The
Evolution of Patentable Subject Matter in the United States, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 1023 (2006)
(detailing the history of Section 101 of the Patent Act , including the development and
subsequent demise of various exceptions to the scope of patentable subject matter); Sam S.
Han, Analyzing the Patentability of “Intangible” Yet “Physical” Subject Matter, 3 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 1, 21-64 (2002) (detailing the federal courts’ struggle with patentable subject
matter); Ralph D. Clifford, The Federal Circuit’s Cruise to Uncharted Waters: How Patent
Protection for Algorithms and Business Methods May Sink the UCITA and State Intellectual
Property Protection, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1241, 1241-62 (2000) (reviewing the expansion in the
scope of patentable subject matter, including the demise of the mathematical algorithm
exception and the business methods exception to patent protection); Robert P. Merges, As
Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and
Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 577 (1999) (describing and criticizing the
grant of business method patents); Robert A. Kneiss, Patent Protection for Computer
Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on Patentable Subject
Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31 (1999).
143. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 483.
144. See supra note 142.
145. See, e.g., Ex parte Latimer, (1889) C.D. 123 (establishing the early principle that
plants are natural products not subject to patent protection); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
185-86 (1981) (noting a limitation on the patenting of abstract ideas, including mathematical
algorithms); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant, Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (refusing to
grant a patent on a bacteria found in nature); U.S. Credit Sys. Co. v. Am. Credit Indem. Co.,
59 F. 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1893) (refusing a patent for a method of doing business).
146. See supra note 142.
147. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
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rules governing the disclosure of patent applications. As noted in a preKewanee law review article, there are a number of principles of U.S.
patent law that promote the public disclosure of inventions, including:
1. The ability of a second inventor to obtain a patent for an
148
invention that was kept secret by the first inventor;
2. The inability of a patent applicant to obtain a patent (or
successfully assert a patent’s validity) if the invention was
used for more than a year before a patent application was
149
filed; and
3. The requirement that a patent applicant fully disclose her
invention in the specification portion of a patent
150
application.
In the opinion of the article’s author, however, because these
principles were not “vigorously” applied by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO), they did not reflect a policy of public
disclosure that was strong enough to trump state trade secret law. The
author cautioned that if the federal patent law was altered in the future
to reflect a more vigorous policy of disclosure, then a renewed
151
preemption analysis would be required.
Since Kewanee, there is no question that the patent policy of public
disclosure has become more vigorous both as a legal and a practical
matter. In 1974, only information that was contained in an issued patent
was disclosed to the public, and to obtain access to such records
required a physical visit to the offices of the USPTO, which were then in
152
Washington, D.C. Thus, an inventor who unsuccessfully sought to
patent her invention could still attempt to protect it under trade secret
law. Since 1999, the presumptive rule is that all U.S. patent applications

148. Doerfer, supra note 63, at 1442, citing 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
149. Id., citing Pierce v. Ben-Ko-Matic, Inc., 310 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1962); MacBethEvans Glass Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 246 F. 695 (6th Cir. 1917); Clay, The Relation of the
Examiner to the Inventor and His Attorney, 1 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 8, 13-16 (1918); and Note,
Prior Art in the Patent Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 369, 384-85 (1959).
150. Doerfer, supra note 63, at 1442-43, citing 35 U.S.C. § 112.
151. Id. at 1447.
152. 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (1974). See also HOWARD I. FORMAN & CHARLES M. ALLEN,
PATENTS, RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR INVENTORS AND EXECUTIVES
(Central Book Co. 1961); JOHN W. KLOOSTER, THE GRANTING OF INVENTIVE RIGHTS
(Intel-Lex 1965); Popular Mechanics, vol. 112 no. 2 (New York 1959) (giving advice on how
to search for prior patents and do-it-yourself patent filing information).
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are published eighteen months after they are filed and remain disclosed
153
even if a patent is not ultimately granted. Thus, the disclosure policy
of U.S. patent law operates much earlier and with respect to more
154
inventions than it did at the time of Kewanee.
Moreover, patent
records of the USPTO are now available for review over the Internet,
155
making what is disclosed in such applications available worldwide.
The end result of both developments is that today’s patent disclosure
policies result in the disclosure of more information and, arguably,
156
This,
increase innovators’ interest in trade secrecy as an alternative.
in turn, creates a greater conflict between the disclosure objectives of
patent law and the secrecy requirements of trade secret law.
B. Changes to Copyright Law since 1974
Kewanee was decided more than a year before the adoption of the
153. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (1999); 37 C.F.R. § 1.215 (2007) (stating that the content of a
patent application publication, which can include amendments, will have the date of
publication, and the content will be based on the specifications and drawings deposited on the
filing date of the application and also the executed oath or declaration to complete the
application). See also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1121 (8th ed. 2007). The
exceptions to this rule concern applications that (i) are no longer pending (i.e., have been
withdrawn before eighteen months), (ii) are subject to a secrecy order, (iii) are provisional
applications, or (iv) are for a design patent. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(A). The rule also does not
apply to applications in which the applicant certifies that the invention has not and will not be
the subject of a patent application in a foreign country. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B).
154. The disclosure is earlier because it happens at eighteen months instead of when
the patent issues, typically more than three years after a patent application is filed. The rule
results in the disclosure of more information because it applies both to applications that result
in issued patents and those that do not. See also David Silverstein, Will Pre-Grant Patent
Publication Undermine United States Trade Secret Law?, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 695, 724 (1995)
(describing the state of the law before the 1999 changes to the Patent Act and opining that
the new disclosure rules undermine the reasoning of Kewanee and threaten trade secret
protection ) (“[T]here would suddenly be a public benefit in compelling the filing of patent
applications even for subject matter that was clearly unpatentable or where patentability was
in doubt.”).
155. The USPTO electronic databases for full issued patents and published
applications are available at http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2008);
Database search for European patents and others around the world, available at
http://www.espacenet.com/index.en.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2008); Google Patent Search
offers a searchable database of over seven million U.S. patents. Some patents date back as
long ago as 1790, available at http://www.google.com/patents (last visited Jan. 23, 2008); the
Department of Energy (DOE) offers patent and application search of DOE-sponsored or
DOE-owned patents, available at http://www.osti.gov/gencoun/search.easy.jsp (last visited
Jan. 24, 2008); the Canadian Intellectual Property Office offers a searchable database of over
seventy-five years of patent images and descriptions, available at http://patents.ic.gc.ca/cipo
/cpd/welcome.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
156. See infra note 227 for a discussion of the factors that influence the choice between
patent and trade secret protection.
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1976 Copyright Act and more than three years before that act went into
157
effect on January 1, 1978. Thus, the Supreme Court did not consider
the substantial changes that the 1976 Copyright Act wrought to U.S.
copyright policy.
Most significantly, in 1974 it was clear that
unpublished works of authorship were not protected by federal
158
copyright law. Since the 1909 Copyright Act (the Act in effect at the
time) required works of authorship to be “published” (i.e., publicly
disseminated) to obtain copyright protection, by definition
159
“copyrighted” works were not secret. Thus, it was inconceivable that
a work protected by copyright law would also be “secret” as that term is
160
understood under trade secret law.
The 1976 Copyright Act altered the state of copyright law in at least
three ways that bear directly upon trade secret law and the Kewanee
decision. First, the scope of copyrightable subject matter was defined
161
and broadened.
Second, copyright protection became automatic for

157. An Act for the general revision of the Copyright Law, Title 17 of the United
States Code, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
158. See generally the 1909 Copyright Act §§ 10-11, Pub. L. 281, 80th Cong., (in effect
from Oct. 25, 1972 until Dec. 30, 1974). Under the 1909 Act, at the time a work was created,
the author of the work acquired so-called “common law copyright” protection. 17 U.S.C. § 2
(1909). See also Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th
Cir. 1999). The common law gave owners various rights with respect to privacy of the work,
the right to first publication, relief from infringement, relief from unfair competition, unjust
enrichment, and conversion. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 4.01[B] (2004). Owners enjoyed these protections until the work was
published. Id. See also Note, Trade Secrets Law After Sears and Compco, 53 VA. L. REV. 361
(noting the pre-1978 recognition of claims for common law copyright to protect unpublished
works and the tendency of courts to apply a narrow definition of publication).
159. Upon publication, if an author or owner complied with the 1909 Act’s
formalities—application of notice of copyright and deposit of two copies of the work in the
U.S Copyright Office—the common law protection converted to a federal statutory
copyright. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.01[A]. See also 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1909) (“Any person
entitled thereto by this title may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the
notice of copyright required by this title . . . .”).
160. Under the UTSA and the trade secret law applied in Kewanee, information is not
a secret if it is “generally known” or “readily ascertainable.” See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 47475; Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1 (amended 1995) (“generally known and easily
ascertainable requirement” does not apply to the public at large but to those who can gain a
competitive, economic advantage from knowing the information. Information is “readily
ascertainable” if it is available in books, pamphlets, brochures, or published trade journals.).
Being able to obtain a work of authorship from the Library of Congress clearly makes it
readily ascertainable even if the information contained in the work may not be generally
known.
161. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). Also, as noted by the Court in Goldstein, U.S. copyright
law was expanded in 1971 to protect “sound recordings.” Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 551-52, citing
Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
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all “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
162
expression.” Thus, it is no longer necessary for the creators of works
of authorship to “publish” (and thereby disclose) their works in order to
163
obtain copyright protection. Rather, the 1976 Copyright Act explicitly
164
extended copyright protection to unpublished works of authorship.
This change, coupled with the broad definition of “works of authorship”
165
contained in the 1976 Copyright Act,
and the low standard of
166
originality required for a work to be protected by copyright law,
means that some “unpublished” secret information that once was only
protected by state trade secret law is now subject to copyright
167
protection as well. This raises the question, unaddressed by Kewanee,
whether state trade secret law is preempted by U.S. copyright law.
C. Changes to Trade Secret Law since 1974
While the changes to patent and copyright law undermine the
reasoning of Kewanee (as discussed more fully in Section V. infra), the
changes that have occurred in trade secret law since 1974 arguably
bolster the Kewanee Court’s reasoning. This is because of the
development of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) and its
168
subsequent enactment by most states.
At the time the UTSA was approved in 1979, the drafting committee
was cognizant of the Kewanee decision and was careful to incorporate
into the UTSA all of the limitations on trade secret law that the Court

162. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
163. 17 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976).
164. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). The 1976 Act largely preempts state common law
protection. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8[C]02.
165. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
166. See generally Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
167. If trade secret information is fixed in a tangible form and includes a modicum of
creativity (i.e., it is not mere facts or other content unprotected by copyright law), it is
protected at least in part by copyright law. See Stephen M. Dorvee, Protecting Trade Secrets
Through Copyright, 1981 DUKE L. J. 981, 990-991 (1981). See also Viva R. Moffat, Mutant
Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property
Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1473 (2004) (discussing how the expansion of the scope
of patent, copyright, and trademark law has resulted in a greater likelihood of overlapping
intellectual property protection).
168. According to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
website, either the 1979 or 1985 version of the UTSA has now been adopted by forty-five
states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. See A Few Facts About the . . .
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, http://www.nccusl.org/update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformactsfs-utsa.asp (last visited Aug. 27, 2007).

2008]

KEWANEE REVISITED

333

169

recognized in the trade secret law of Ohio. Furthermore, although the
UTSA tracks the Kewanee Court’s recitation of the narrow scope of
Ohio’s trade secret law, the UTSA limited the scope of protection even
more by: (1) imposing the requirement that the information derive
independent economic value from being secret; (2) refusing to extend its
coverage to mere “confidential” information; (3) limiting the length of
injunctive relief; and (4) specifically precluding other common law
170
Consistent with the law applied in Kewanee, the
causes of action.
UTSA also requires that the defendant in a trade secret case engage in a
171
wrongful act, i.e., “misappropriation” in the parlance of the UTSA.
Because the UTSA narrowed the universe of information that can
qualify for trade secret protection, it arguably reduces the conflicts that
can occur between patent, copyright, and trade secret law. Whether this
reduction is sufficient to counterbalance the increased conflicts that
occur as a result of post-1974 changes to patent and copyright law is the
critical question. Consistent with the Court’s reasoning in Kewanee, the
narrowing of the scope of trade secret protection should incentivize
more inventors to seek patent protection because trade secret
172
protection is weaker than at the time of Kewanee. However, whether
an inventor decides to pursue patent protection depends on a number of
practical, economic, and strategic considerations that were not
173
The existence of conflict also
considered by the Kewanee Court.
depends a great deal on how state courts interpret and apply the UTSA.
If, as Solicitor General Bork feared, state courts apply state trade secret
law in a manner that results in the protection of public domain
information or perpetual injunctions, then a clear conflict with federal
patent and copyright policies is created.
IV. KEWANEE REFRESHED
Given that patent, copyright, and trade secret law has changed
substantially since 1974, it is necessary to consider whether either the
outcome or reasoning of Kewanee must change as a result. As is
discussed in more detail in the subsections that follow, hindsight reveals
that there are at least four problems with the Kewanee Court’s

169. Sandeen, supra note 13 at p. 132, n. 50.
170. Id. 129-32, n. 38-45.
171. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(2)
“misappropriation.”
172. See supra note 121.
173. Discussed in Section IV., infra.

(amended

1985),

definition

of
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preemption analysis. First, it is too narrow because it fails to apply all
relevant preemption doctrines.
In addition to the issues of
constitutional preemption and conflict preemption, there are two other
Supremacy Clause preemption doctrines that must be examined:
express preemption and field preemption. Second, the Kewanee Court’s
preemption analysis is based upon factual assumptions that, at best, are
174
In
unsupported by any empirical evidence and, at worst, are untrue.
particular, the analysis relies heavily upon the beliefs that trade secret
law encourages the disclosure of information through licensing and that,
when given the choice, inventors are likely to choose trade secret
protection over patent protection. Neither statement is accurate.
The third problem with the Kewanee Court’s analysis is that it fails
to clearly articulate a workable test for determining when state laws that
provide protection for information that is also protected by federal law
should be preempted. Although given the opportunity to clarify its
decisions in Sears/Compco and mollify fears that Sears/Compco was the
death knell of all state unfair competition laws, the Court chose to focus
its analysis on Ohio’s trade secret law. In so doing, the Court provided
little guidance on how to evaluate cases where state law potentially
could, but did not always, protect information that is also protected by
federal law. Related to this weakness in the Court’s analysis is a fourth
problem: the reluctance of the Court to consider the possibility that,
although state law may not be preempted on its face, it can be
preempted “as applied.”
A. Problem One: The Court’s Preemption Analysis is Incomplete
As noted above, the Kewanee Court’s preemption analysis began
with a question of constitutional preemption, i.e., whether Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution vests exclusive power in
175
Congress “to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts.” The
Court in Goldstein answered this question in the negative and nothing
has happened since 1974 to alter the Court’s view that, under the patent
and copyright clause of the Constitution at least, states are free to
regulate in areas left unattended by federal law. The Constitutional
preemption doctrine, however, is not the only preemption doctrine that
is recognized by the Supreme Court. There is also what is known as
176
“Supremacy Clause preemption.”
174. See supra notes 115-117; infra Section IV.B. and accompanying text.
175. See supra Section II. B.
176. See supra notes 92, 93.
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Although defined in various ways by different courts and
commentators, in essence there are two types of Supremacy Clause
177
preemption: express preemption and implied preemption.
Express
preemption of state law occurs when a provision of federal law is
178
adopted that states that similar state laws are preempted. As the label
suggests, implied preemption occurs when the federal regulatory
scheme is such that it can be inferred that Congress intended to
179
Implied preemption is
preclude the application of similar state laws.
generally sub-divided into “field preemption” and “conflict
180
preemption.”
1. Express Preemption
At the time of Kewanee, no viable argument could be made that
federal law expressly preempted state trade secret law because no
provision of federal law, particularly the Patent Act, expressed the
intent of Congress to preclude state trade secret law. More than thirtythree years after Kewanee, there is still no express preemption provision
181
contained in the Patent Act. Instead, since Kewanee was decided, the
U.S. Congress has amended the Patent Act several times and could have
182
expressed its intent to preempt trade secret laws.
It not only did not
177. See supra note 93. See also Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 227
(2000) and Sara A. Colangelo, The Politics of Preemption: An Application of Preemption
Jurisprudence and Policy to California Assembly Bill 1493, 37 ENVTL. L. 175, 184 (2007). See
also Pamela Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl, How Tensions Between Intellectual Property Policy
and UCITA are Likely to be Resolved, 570 PLI/PAT 741 (1999) (describing the various types
of preemption).
178. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (“Congress’ command is
explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and
purpose.”). See also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992), quoting Jones,
430 U.S. at 525.
179. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. See also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504
(1956) (describing implied preemption when there is federal occupation of a field in such a
way that there is “no room” left for state regulation); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (concluding that in the absence
of an express congressional command, state law is preempted when that law “actually
conflicts with federal law”); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982) (concluding that if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field “as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” then
preemption occurs).
180. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51-64 (2002); and Aerocon Eng’g, Inc.
v. Silicon Valley Bank (In re World Auxiliary Power Co.), 303 F.3d 1120, 1128-29 (2002).
181. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480 (“The patent law does not explicitly endorse or forbid
the operation of trade secret law.”). Note also that since 1974, the U.S. Congress adopted the
federal Electronic Espionage Act. See infra notes 183, 184 and accompanying text.
182. This point was also made in Petitioner’s brief wherein it is noted:
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do so, but it adopted a trade secret law of its own known as the
183
Economic Espionage Act of 1996. That Act contains a savings clause,
which states: “This chapter shall not be construed to preempt or
displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by
United States Federal, State, commonwealth, possession, or territory
184
Thus, if state trade
law for the misappropriation of a trade secret.”
secret law is preempted by patent law it must be based upon a theory of
implied preemption.
In contrast to the Patent Act, there is an express preemption
provision in the 1976 Copyright Act. Section 301(a) of the 1976
Copyright Act provides:
On or after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship
that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether
published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent
right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any
185
State.
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to render a decision concerning the
scope and meaning of Section 301 of the Copyright Act (hereafter
referred to as “section 301 preemption”). The circuit courts that have

Many times prior to the codification of the patent laws in 1952, this Court held that
state trade secret law could peacefully coexist with the federal patent law. In view
of these holdings, there is no basis for thinking that Congress could have intended
that by enacting the Patent Code it was doing away with the states’ right to protect
trade secrets from misappropriation by persons who stood in a fiduciary relationship
to the trade secret proprietor and had expressly agreed to keep the secrets in
confidence.
Brief of Petitioner, supra note 74, at 41.
183. Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996). See also Gerald J. Mossinghoff et al.,
The Economic Espionage Act: A New Federal Regime of Trade Secret Protection, 79 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 191 (1997).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (1996).
185. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976). In contrast, the 1909 Copyright Act contained a savings
clause that stated, “Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the
author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the
copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without the consent, and to obtain
damages therefor.” 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1909).
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considered the question, while differing somewhat in their
interpretation and application of section 301 preemption, generally
agree that a state statute is expressly preempted if: (1) the information
to be protected falls within the scope of copyrightable subject matter;
and (2) the rights asserted under the state law are equivalent to the
186
rights contained in the U.S. Copyright Act.
According to most circuit courts, the subject matter requirement not
only takes into account what is protected under U.S. Copyright law, but
187
what is not protected.
The subject matter requirement of Section 301 is satisfied if a
work fits within the general subject matter of Sections 102 and
103 of the Copyright Act, regardless of whether it qualifies for
copyright protection. [Citation omitted.] In Wrench, this court
joined several other circuits in holding that for purposes of
preemption, the scope of the Copyright Act‘s subject matter is
188
broader than the scope of its protection.
The foregoing rule is consistent with the Supreme Court’s observation
in Goldstein that “[a] conflict would develop if a State attempted to
protect that which Congress intended to be free from restraint or to free
189
that which Congress had protected.”
Based upon the broad definition of section 301 preemption subject
matter, it is fairly easy for courts to conclude that information that is
186. See Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 455 (6th Cir. 2001); Nat’l
Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1997); United States ex rel.
Berge v. Board of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1463 (4th Cir. 1997); ProCd, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996); Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F. Supp.
2d 1115, 1123-24 (N.D. Cal. 2001); and Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co.,
LLC, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1691, 1693 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
187. Wrench LLC, 256 F.3d at 455. But see Dunlap v. G & L Holding Group, Inc., 381
F.3d 1285, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that Section 301 subject matter is limited to “only
those elements that are substantively qualified for copyright protection”), citing Warren
Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1514 (11th Cir. 1997).
188. Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 309 (6th Cir. 2004), citing Wrench
LLC, 256 F.3d at 454-55; and Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
805 F.2d 663, 676 (7th Cir. 1986), quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 131, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5747.
189. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 559. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently
explained, “Baltimore Orioles holds that state laws that intrude on the domain of copyright
are preempted even if the particular expression is neither copyrighted nor copyrightable.
Such a result is essential in order to preserve the extent of the public domain established by
copyright law.” Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2005), referring to its
earlier decision in Baltimore Orioles, Inc., 805 F.2d 663.

338 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL. PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:2

sought to be protected by state law meets the first requirement of
section 301 preemption. If the information is “fixed in tangible form,” it
is either expressly protected by copyright because it is “original,” or it is
excluded from copyright protection because it does not meet the
originality requirement or because it is a type of information for which
190
Thus, to the extent trade secrets
copyright protection is unavailable.
are “fixed,” they meet the subject matter requirement of section 301
preemption, and the second requirement of the statute must be
examined.
While some trade secrets may escape section 301 preemption
because they are not fixed in tangible form, the more likely preemption
question is whether trade secret claims meet the “equivalency
requirement” of section 301 preemption (also referred to as the
“general scope requirement”). As the Second Circuit has explained:
The general scope requirement is satisfied only when the statecreated right may be abridged by an act that would, by itself,
infringe one of the exclusive rights provided by federal copyright
law. [Citation omitted.] In other words, the state law claim must
involve acts of reproduction, adaptation, performance,
distribution or display. [Citations Omitted.] Further, the state
law claim must not include any extra elements that make it
qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim.
191
[Citations Omitted].
The circuit courts that have considered whether state trade secret
laws are expressly preempted by Section 301 of the Copyright Act have
typically found that they provide the “extra element” needed to avoid

190. Section 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act provides that “[i]n no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such works.” 15 U.S.C. §
102(b) (1976). The Copyright Act, therefore, clearly channels the protection of such works
elsewhere; namely, toward patent and trade secret law. However, it is a mistake to consider
the works listed in Section 102(b) as being coextensive with the types of works that can be
protected by trade secret law. Although Section 102(b) lists information that is traditionally
thought of when one thinks of trade secrets, there are other bits and bodies of information
that may be trade secrets and that, conceivably, could be protected by copyright law as well.
This includes, for instance, written forms and customer lists.
191. 17 U.S.C. § 106; Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 305-06 (2d
Cir. 2004), citing Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992);
and Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 851 (2d Cir. 1997).
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192

express preemption.
More often than not, those courts cited the
misappropriation prong of trade secret law as the required extra
193
element. However, whether state trade secret law (or any state unfair
competition law for that matter) is expressly preempted by Section 301
ultimately depends upon the precise wording of the state statute and,
arguably, the precise allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint. It is not
enough for courts to rely upon the extra elements supplied by the
UTSA; they should also carefully examine the character of the
information sought to be protected and the essential nature of the
194
underlying action.
Obviously, even if an extra element appears to
exist on the face of a challenged state statute, it is rendered meaningless
in cases where trial courts fail to require proof of the extra element.
2. Field Preemption
As noted above, field preemption is one of two recognized forms of
implied Supremacy Clause preemption and one of two forms of
195
preemption that the Kewanee Court failed to directly address.
According to the doctrine of field preemption, state laws will be deemed

192. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307
F.3d 197, 216-19 (3rd Cir. 2002); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d
1147, 1164-65 (1st Cir. 1994); Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 660 (4th
Cir. 1993); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 847-48 (10th Cir.
1993); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 716; S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081,
1090 n. 13 (9th Cir. 1989); Stromback, 384 F.3d at 304. See also Ez-Tixz, Inc. v. Hit-Tix, Inc.,
919 F. Supp. 728, 737-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
193. See Stromback, 384 F.3d at 304 (identifying proof of a confidential relationship as
the extra element); Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., 307 F.3d at 218 (identifying the alleged
breach of duty of trust and confidentiality as the extra element); Trandes, 996 F.2d at 660
(identifying breach of trust or confidence as the extra element); Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 84748 (identifying breach of trust or confidence as the extra element). However, as is discussed
more fully in Section V., infra, the existence of a trade secret is also an essential element of a
trade secret claim, particularly in light of the definition of copyrightable subject matter. See
infra Section V. See also Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1130-31 (2001)
(identifying the requirement of secrecy as the extra element and opining that the plaintiff’s
trade secret claim was qualitatively different from a copyright infringement action).
194. See Section V, infra. See also Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134,
1144 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (“[n]ot every ‘extra element’ of a state law claim will establish a qualitative variance
between the rights protected by federal copyright law and those protected by state law”),
quoting Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1164, and citing Computer Assocs. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693,
716 (2d Cir. 1992). In Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 116465 (1st Cir. 1994), the court explained that the mere existence of an extra element does not
make a cause of action qualitatively different. The state cause of action must include both an
extra element and be qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim.
195. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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to be preempted when it appears that Congress intended to occupy the
196
entire field, thus precluding any state or local regulation.
The
Supreme Court in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator explained, “[t]he scheme of
federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
197
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”
Due to the expansion of patentable and copyrightable subject matter
post-1974, it is hard to imagine information that would not be within the
scheme of federal regulation. However, the enactment of Section 301 of
the Copyright Act and the savings clause of the Economic Espionage
Act suggest that Congress did not intend federal law to “so occupy the
field” that state trade secret law cannot co-exist with patent and
copyright law. Moreover, if field preemption were considered as part of
an updated Kewanee analysis, it is unlikely to be successful due to the
198
In this
simple fact that the Supreme Court can define “the field.”
regard, the Supreme Court’s field preemption jurisprudence is a lot like
its obscenity jurisprudence; although it has articulated a rule, the
decision to actually apply the rule is a case of knowing it when it sees
199
it.
The success of a field preemption argument is also highly
dependent on whether the Court applies the presumption against
preemption that is applicable to areas of law traditionally within the

196. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 104 n. 2 (1992) (“[F]ield preemption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption: A state law that falls within
a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress’ intent (either express or plainly implied) to
exclude state regulation”); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (federal interest in a field is “so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject”);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (describing a field in which federal
regulation is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it”).
197. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, citing Pa. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569
(1919); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
198. See Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (holding that patent law so occupied the field with respect to the definition of
inventorship).
199. See Nelson, supra note 177 (noting that the Supreme Court has become
increasingly reluctant to find field preemption). At the time of Kewanee, suggestions were
made that the field covered by U.S. patent law should be defined to include all information
that is patentable. Under this approach, if an invention could be patented then the doctrine
of field preemption would apply to prevent parallel trade secret protection. If, however, the
information sought to be protected was not patentable, then the states were free to provide
trade secret protection. The Supreme Court rejected this so-called “partial preemption”
argument as unworkable because it would require state courts to determine the patentability
of information that was the subject of a trade secret claim. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 492 (1974).
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purview of the states.
With respect to patent and copyright law, both the presumption
against preemption and the definition of the field can cut both for and
against the preemption of trade secret law. If the Court defines the field
broadly to include all information within and without the scope of
patentable subject matter and all information within the scope of
201
copyrightable subject matter as it suggested it would in Goldstein,
then federal law occupies the field. Similarly, if one considers the
constitutional basis and history of U.S. patent and copyright law and the
fact that patent and copyright claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal courts, then arguably the presumption against preemption
202
does not apply.
Indeed, this position is consistent with the Court’s
statement in Lear that, when in doubt, the policies underlying
203
Sears/Compco should prevail.
Conversely, if the Court defines the field of patent and copyright law
narrowly to provide only the limited grant of exclusive rights for some
information and recognizes that trade secret law is primarily concerned
with preventing unfair business practices, then U.S. patent and
copyright law does not occupy the field. Furthermore, the presumption
against preemption should apply because the regulation of business
practices is an area of law that has historically been left to the states.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of field
preemption as directly as it should, particularly in light of post-1974
changes in the scope of patent and copyright law, this author believes
that the Court’s obvious desire to preserve state trade secret law would
lead it to conclude that field preemption does not apply, the

200. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989), citing Hillsborough County
v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 716 (1985) (“When Congress legislates in a field
traditionally occupied by the States, ‘we start with the assumption that the historic police
power of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230)). But see Calvin Massey,
“Jolting Joe Has Left and Gone Away”: The Vanishing Presumption Against Preemption, 66
ALB. L. REV. 759 (2003); Timothy J. Conlan and Robert L. Dudley, Janus-Faced Federalism:
State Sovereignty and Federal Preemption in the Rehnquist Court, PSOnline, July 2005,
http://www.apsanet. Org/imgtest/363-366.pdf.
201. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973). See also United States v. Locke,
529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (“‘assumption’ of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State
regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence”).
202. Locke, 529 U.S. at 108 (2000) (“The ‘assumption’ of nonpre-emption is not
triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant
federal presence.”).
203. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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troublesome language of Goldstein notwithstanding. In so doing, and
205
consistent with the section 301 preemption analysis set forth above, it
would be forced to define the field narrowly and emphasize the
traditional rationale for trade secret protection (i.e., the prevention of
unfair business practices) and downplay the rationale that it emphasized
in Kewanee (i.e., the disclosure rationale). The question then becomes
whether this switch in emphasis will help or hinder the Court’s analysis
of conflict preemption.
B. Problem Two: The Court’s Conflict Preemption Analysis is
Incomplete and Based upon Unsupported Factual Assumptions
While the existence of an express preemption provision suggests that
implied preemption is not possible, the Supreme Court has held
206
otherwise.
Thus, despite the express preemption provision of
copyright law, courts are free to consider whether the doctrine of
207
conflict preemption applies to preclude the enforcement of state laws.
As stated by the Supreme Court in Kewanee, the relevant question: Do
state trade secret laws stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
208
objectives of U.S. patent and copyright laws?
As detailed above, the Kewanee court was primarily concerned that
the availability of trade secret protection would lead an innovator to
choose it over patent protection and that trade secret law was
209
To allay its
inconsistent with the disclosure purposes of patent law.
concerns, the Court first went to great pains to align the objectives of
trade secret law with the objectives of patent law so that even if an
innovator chose trade secret protection over patent protection, the
210
objectives embodied in federal patent policy would be furthered.
In
so doing, it deemphasized the primary objective of trade secret law (to
prevent unfair competition) and highlighted two secondary objectives
204. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
205. See supra Section IV.A.1.
206. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001) (“neither an
express pre-emption provision nor a savings clause ‘bar[s] the ordinary working of conflict
pre-emption principles”), citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
207. See the discussion of conflict preemption infra Part IV.B.
208. There are actually two types of conflict preemption: (1) the preemption that
occurs when a person cannot possibility comply with both state and federal law; and (2) the
preemption that occurs when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
objectives of federal law. Nelson, supra note 177, at 228. The second type was at issue in
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479.
209. See supra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
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211

(to encourage invention and disclosure).
Next, it suggested that the
type of information protected under patent and trade secret law was
different. It then equated the limited licensing of information that trade
secret law allows with the disclosure purposes of patent law. Finally,
without any empirical evidence to back up its assumption, the Court
concluded that most innovators would choose patent protection over
212
trade secret protection.
The changes in patent law since 1974 undercut at least one rationale
of the Kewanee Court: the argument that information protected by
213
trade secret law is of a different character than patentable inventions.
Because of the broadened scope of patentable subject matter,
information falling outside its scope now encompasses only a small
214
percentage of the information that may be protected as a trade secret.
This fact does not lead automatically to the conclusion that trade secret
law is now preempted by federal law. It does, however, mean that the
categories of information that the Kewanee Court was most concerned
about (Categories 2 and 3) are comprised of more information, and thus
it is more likely that inventors will be confronted with a choice between
patent and trade secret protection.
Arguably, the new patent application disclosure rules help to
counterbalance the expansion of patentable subject matter by
dissuading inventors with inventions of questionable patentability from
215
applying for a patent in the first place.
Thus, even though the raw
number of inventions falling within Categories 2 and 3 of the Kewanee
analysis may have increased, the number of inventors who will burden
the Patent Office with applications “doomed to be turned down” should
216
On the other hand, given the lag in time between the
decrease.
disclosure of patent applications (eighteen months after filing) and the

211. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 121-23 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 152-156 and accompanying text.
214. See Clifford, supra note 142, at 1241 (“Today, it is difficult to imagine anything for
which a patent cannot be sought and received.”).
215. Arguably, this tendency to choose trade secret protection over patent protection is
also furthered by changes that were made in 1999 to the “prior user defense” of 35 U.S.C. §
273. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113 § 1000(a)(9),
113 Stat. 1505, 1536 (1999). See also James R. Barney, The Prior User Defense: A Reprieve
for Trade Secret Owners or a Disaster for the Patent Law?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 261, 272-73 (2000) (arguing that the prior user defense not only undermines the patent
policy of disclosure, but also reduces the incentive for trade secret owners to challenge the
validity of patented inventions).
216. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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ultimate grant of a patent (more than two years after filing), the new
disclosure rules are likely to dissuade some owners of clearly patentable
218
Because this was the scenario of
inventions from filing for a patent.
most concern to the Kewanee Court, the changes to the disclosure rules
of patent law also undermine the reasoning of the Kewanee Court.
The Kewanee Court’s analysis of the disclosure purposes of patent
and trade secret law is further undermined by the Court’s assumption
that the disclosure that occurs through the licensing of trade secrets is
equivalent to the level of disclosure that occurs under patent law.
Although it is true that trade secret law helps to facilitate the sharing of
secret information between those with a need to know (e.g., employees,
vendors, and co-venturers), the scope and nature of the disclosure is
both qualitatively and quantitatively different from patent law. U.S.
patent law requires patent applicants to fully disclose their inventions in
a detailed specification, and patent rights can be lost if it is later
219
determined that the disclosure was insufficient.
The purpose of this
requirement is two-fold: (1) it enables a person who is skilled in the art
to practice the invention once the patent expires; and (2) it puts the
industry on notice of the precise parameters of the claimed invention so
220
that infringement can be avoided. When a patent is issued, the entire
prosecution history—including the original patent application, the
specification, the drawings, all correspondence with the USPTO, and all
amendments to the patent application—are available for review. As
noted above, this information is now widely available over the Internet.
The sharing and licensing of trade secret information need not be as
detailed and cannot be as wide-spread as the disclosure of information
that occurs under patent law. In fact, according to the reasonable
efforts requirement of the UTSA, trade secret owners will destroy the
protectable status of their information if they share too much with too
221
many people.
Thus, it is generally recommended that trade secret
217. Statistics on the average time for patent application pendency is about 24.6
months, available at http://www.uspto.gov/main/faq/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (last updated
Aug. 14, 2003).
218. Before the changes to the patent application disclosure policy, the maintenance of
information as a trade secret would result in the inability to obtain a patent if the underlying
patent application was filed more than one year after the public use or sale of such
information. However, because the definition of public use and sale under patent law is
different from the trade secret concepts of “generally known” or “readily ascertainable,” it
was possible to maintain such information as a trade secret.
219. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 122, 282(3) (2000).
220. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).
221. UTSA § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 536 (1985). See also Sandeen, supra
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owners limit the scope and nature of any disclosures to a need-to-know
222
If trade secrets are being used solely within an organization,
basis.
then only faithful employees who absolutely need to know the
information should have access to it, and only if they are under a duty of
confidentiality.
If trade secrets are being used outside of an
organization, e.g., by vendors, contractors, business partners, or
licensees, similar strategies for preserving the relative secrecy of the
information should be used, including written confidentiality
223
agreements that limit the use and dissemination of the information.
While the licensed technology may involve numerous bits of trade secret
information, only the specific information that is needed by the
particular licensee is usually disclosed.
The reasoning of the Kewanee Court is further undermined by its
attempt to predict when inventors will choose patent protection over
trade secret protection. While the sheer number of patent applications
that have been filed in recent years suggests that the lure of patent
224
protection is stronger than ever, there is little empirical evidence to
support the Kewanee Court’s assumption that most inventors will
choose patent protection over trade secret protection. By definition,
trade secret owners do not announce their discoveries or publicize their
decisions to choose trade secret protection over patent protection.
Thus, the increase in patent applications does not necessarily mean that
there is a corresponding decrease in trade secrets. To the contrary, the
heightened interest in intellectual property protection has led many
businesses to engage in a comprehensive and highly sophisticated
225
analysis of the best intellectual property strategies to pursue.

note 13, at 138-40 (describing the reasonable efforts requirement).
222. 1 ROGER MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (2007); JAMES
POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 4.04[2] (2007).
223. Id. at § 8.02 (2007).
224. For statistics on the increase in patent applications over the course of the past
thirty-three years, particularly after the expansion of patentable subject matter, see
Christopher L. Logan, Patent Reform 2005: HR 2795 and the Road to Post-Grant
Oppositions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 975, 982-83 (2006); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. et al., Continuing
Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office—Extended, 12
FED. CIR. B.J. 35 (2002); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent
Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 11 FED. Cir. B.J. 1
(2001); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 316 (2001). For statistics on use of the patent
system by individual inventors, see Douglas N. Modlin & Michael A. Glenn, International
Patent Strategies for Individual Inventors, 6 J. HIGH TECH. L. 129 (2006).
225. See, e.g., Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial
Perspective, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 689 (1996) (discussing the analysis that
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Typically, this analysis proceeds on the assumption that multiple forms
of intellectual property protection are possible and that, depending on
the nature of the inventions, patent protection is not always the best
226
option.
While many inventors choose to pursue patent protection for the
reasons mentioned in Kewanee, many inventors choose not to pursue
patent protection for numerous reasons not acknowledged in
227
Kewanee. These reasons include:
1. The costs to prepare, file, and prosecute a patent application;
2. The costs to maintain and enforce patent rights;
3. The costs to pursue patent rights in all the countries where
the invention might be made, used, or sold;
4. The nature of the invention and the difficulty of reverse
engineering and independent discovery;
5. The value of the invention and the potential for earning
significant income from the invention during the potentially
short term of trade secret protection;
6. The manner in which the invention is distributed;
7. The risk that once obtained, a patent will later be found to be
invalid;
8. An unwillingness to disclose the details of the invention;
9. Market forces, including the frequency with which new
innovations replace old innovations; and
10. The availability of other forms of protection, including those
available under copyright, trade secret, contract, and
228
criminal law.
Thus, it was inaccurate and naïve for the Kewanee Court to assert that a
would be engaged in by the chemical, mechanical, and electrical industries).
226. Multiple forms of intellectual property protection are available because inventions
are often comprised of different parts that may be protected under different intellectual
property doctrines. For instance, a “new” chair may be protected by a utility patent (covering
the fastener that attaches the seat back to the chair frame), a design patent (covering the
shape of the chair), a trademark (covering the name of the chair), and copyrights (covering
the advertising copy and promotional materials for the chair).
227. For a discussion of this choice, see Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice
Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, n. 3; Holly M. Amjad, Patent vs. Trade Secret: Look at
Costs, Industry, Returns, BUS. J. KAN. CITY (2002); Sharon K. Sandeen, Checklist for
Choosing Between Patent and Trade Secret Protection, 479 PLI/PAT 725 (1997); Munson,
supra note 225; and Note, Trade Secrets Law After Sears and Compco, 53 VA. L. REV. 356,
369 (1967).
228. Id.
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significant number of inventors do not consciously choose to forego
patent protection when it is available to them. This is particularly true
with respect to inventions that can be publicly used without fully
disclosing embedded trade secrets, such as the formula for Coca-Cola,
computer programs, and genetically engineered materials, and with
respect to information that might also be protected pursuant to
229
copyright or contract law.
Finally, the Court’s conflict preemption analysis suffers from the fact
that it does not address the possibility of overlapping trade secret and
copyright protection.
Nor did the Court consider whether the
availability of overlapping copyright, trade secret, and contract
protection for certain inventions, such as computer software, might lead
innovators to forsake patent protection. Applying the missing analysis
today, the Court would presumably use the same analysis that it applied
in Kewanee and compare the objectives of U.S. copyright law with the
objectives of trade secret law. Since the primary objective of U.S.
copyright law is to encourage creativity and the creation of works of
230
authorship, consistent with its observation in Kewanee, the Court
would not be troubled by the existence of a state law that also
231
Moreover, since the Copyright Act does not
encourages creativity.
require authors to publicly disclose their works, the Court would not be
concerned that trade secret law conflicted with a disclosure objective of
232
It can be argued, however, that the availability of
copyright law.

229. See Ozzie A. Farres & Stephen T. Schreiner, Patent or Trade Secret: Which is
Better?, 124 BANKING L. J. 274, 277, 279 (2007) (citing Coke as a classic example and arguing
that trade secret protection is more desirable, “particular[ly] if the technology can be kept
secret with relative ease”); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 637-38, 64042 (2002) (arguing that an invention that is difficult to reverse engineer or that a competitor
would view as cost prohibitive to copy may as well seek trade secret protection because the
information holder is allowed to keep secret the information it has acquired, as opposed to
patent protection, which requires complete disclosure of the information); Munson, supra
note 225, at 692 (arguing that the most important consideration regarding the decision to seek
patent versus trade secret protection is “whether inspection of the goods containing the new
invention could be expected to disclose the invention itself”—in other words, whether reverse
engineering should be expected to reveal the nature of the invention).
230. In Goldstein, the Court identified two purposes of copyright law: to encourage
creativity and to achieve uniformity. Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546.
231. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 493 (1974) (“Trade secret law encourages the development
and exploitation of those items of lesser or different invention than might be accorded
protection under the patent laws, but which items still have an important part to play in the
technological and scientific advancement of the Nation.”).
232. Arguably, the deposit requirement of U.S. copyright law (17 U.S.C. § 704) is a
disclosure requirement, but only to the extent that works deposited with the U.S. Copyright
Office are available for inspection by the public. Because the U.S. Copyright Office has
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overlapping copyright, trade secret, and contract protection may
233
dissuade some innovators from seeking available patent protection.
In this regard, the Court’s analysis in Kewanee relies heavily on the
assumption, clearly undermined since Kewanee, that the choice of
intellectual property protection is usually a one-versus-the-other-versusthe-other-proposition.
C. Problem Three: The Court’s Failure to Articulate a Clear, Unifying
Test for Intellectual Property Preemption
By basing its analysis on the premise that most innovators will
choose patent protection over trade secret protection, the Kewanee
Court backed itself into an analytical corner. Unless it is willing in
future cases to ignore the fact that many innovators forego patent
protection in favor of alternative forms of legal protection, a different
rationale for the Kewanee decision must be articulated, i.e., one that is
not dependent upon unsubstantiated assumptions about inventor
motivations. Additionally, if, as suggested above, the Section 301 and
field preemption analyses require the Court to emphasize the
prevention-of-unfair-competition objective of trade secret law in order
to avoid express and field preemption, then the Court’s reliance on the
asserted disclosure and incentive rationales of trade secret law also does
not withstand the test of time.
If one ignores the incentive and disclosure rationales of Kewanee,
adopted rules that enable less than full deposits of works for the purpose of protecting trade
secrets, whatever disclosure purpose might be found in the deposit requirement is illusory at
best. See Robert H. Solomon, The Copyrightability of Computer Software Containing Trade
Secrets, 63 WASH. U. L. Q. 131, 146-47 (1985) (“[d]eposit of software with the Copyright
Office may reveal nothing to persons who wish to examine the deposit. . . . [One] who does
locate the desired deposit may find only the first and last twenty-five pages of computer
program or data base with all trade secrets carefully excised from the deposit.”).
233. See Jonathan D. Carpenter, Intellectual Property: The Overlap Between Utility
Patents, Plant Patents, the PVPA, and Trade Secrets and the Limitations on That Overlap, 81
N.D. L. REV. 171 (2005); Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The
Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1473
(2004) (discussing how the expansion of the scope of patent, copyright, and trademark law
has resulted in a greater likelihood of overlapping intellectual property protection) ; Gideon
Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88
VA. L. REV. 1455 (2002) (finding synergies between the four areas of intellectual property
protection and describing the effects of possible combination of patent with trademark
protection and copyright with trade secret protection); Katherine M. Todd & John M.
Hession, Intellectual Property Law, 539 PLI/COMM 335, 383-86 (1990) (identifying difficult
substantive standards, the cost of protection, delays in perfecting protection, no immediate
protection, and possible antitrust liabilities as disadvantages to pursuing patent protection
over copyright or trade secret protection).
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the argument that most inventors will choose patent over trade secret
protection, and the argument that trade secret law protects a lot of
information left unprotected by other federal intellectual property laws,
what is left? Is there a rationale embedded in the Kewanee decision or
in other intellectual property preemption cases that would support the
outcome of the case even if much of its reasoning has been undermined
by post-1974 changes to patent and copyright law? Moreover, given the
Supreme Court’s concerns about the administrative burdens of a partial
preemption analysis, is there a way to avoid requiring state courts to
determine the patentability of trade secret information? The answer to
these questions lies in a first principle of intellectual property law, i.e.,
the principle that free competition is the rule and intellectual property
234
protection is the exception.
As the Court recognized in the Sears/Compco cases, in the context
of intellectual property law, the issue of preemption is not simply about
the proper relationship between the state and federal government. It is
also about preserving the balance between intellectual property
protection and free competition that the federal intellectual property
235
laws seek to achieve.
Unfortunately, while the Supreme Court’s
concern for free competition is at the heart of the Sears/Compco
236
doctrine, the Court abandoned this focus in Kewanee.
Instead, it
chose to emphasize the alleged disclosure rationales of patent and trade
secret law.
Fortunately, the Court’s 1989 decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., marked a return to the free competition

234. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146-48 (1989);
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031
(2005) (“Free competition is the norm. Intellectual property rights are an exception to that
norm . . . .”). See also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1:1 (4th ed. 2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995) (“The freedom to engage in business and to compete for the
patronage of prospective customers is a fundamental premise of the free enterprise system.”).
235. See Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of
Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959 (1991) (describing the balance in terms of economic
efficiency and the maximization of public wealth).
See also GUSTAVO GHIDINI,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW 104 (Edward Elgar 2006). While this
balance can be upset both by the adoption of state laws and the expansion of federal
intellectual property laws, the latter scenario does not raise preemption issues except to the
extent that a greater conflict between state and federal laws results or the expansion of
federal law evidences an intent by Congress to “occupy the field.” Apparently, Congress is
free to upset this balance as long as it does not exceed its Constitutional powers. See, e.g.,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
236. See Heald, supra note 235, at 988.
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concerns that underlie the Sears/Compco doctrine and provides the
237
basis for a refreshed analysis of Kewanee. As the Court observed:
From their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a
careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the
recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are
both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a
238
competitive economy.
While the Court in Bonito Boats was concerned with ensuring
“substantially free trade in publicly known, unpatented design and
utilitarian conceptions,” it nonetheless recognized that there might be
limited circumstances in which state unfair competition laws will avoid
239
preemption.
Unfair competition laws can survive a preemption
challenge if they do not preclude the use of the information in other
contexts and are designed to remedy some other wrong (e.g., consumer
240
confusion).
Another way to frame the test of Bonito Boats is to say that state
laws avoid federal preemption if they do not unduly interfere with
either of the dual aspects of federal intellectual property policies. First,
they cannot unduly disrupt the incentive rationale of federal patent and
241
copyright laws.
Second, even if the incentive rationale is not
disrupted, state laws cannot unduly restrict free competition by: (a)
prohibiting the use of information upon which others should be allowed
237. Bonito, 489 U.S. at 141. See also Heald, supra note 235, at 988 (“As the
resurrector of Sears/Compco and the reconciler of Goldstein, Kewanee, and Aronson, Bonito
Boats firmly established that any state law which upsets the balance struck between benefits
to society and benefits to inventors by patent law is preempted.”); Keith Aoki, Balancing Act:
Reflections on Justice O’Connor’s Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 965
(2007) (highlighting Bonito Boats’ policy of free competition and innovation, in which
intellectual property rights are an exception against free competition); S. Stephen Hilmy,
Bonito Boats’ Resurrection of the Preemption Controversy: The Patent Leverage Charade and
the Lanham Act “End Around,” 69 TEX. L. REV. 729 (1991); and David E. Shipley, Refusing
to Rock the Boat: The Sears/Compco Preemption Doctrine Applied to Bonito Boats v.
Thunder Craft, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 385 (1990).
238. Bonito, 489 U.S. at 146.
239. Id. at 156.
240. Id.
241. See, e.g., Biotech. Indus. Org. v. Dist. of Columbia, 505 F.3d 1343, 1345 (2007)
(holding that a state law concerning the pricing of pharmaceuticals interfered with the
incentive rationale of patent law.); Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d
1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “federal patent law preempts any state law that
purports to define rights based on inventorship” because state laws would lack uniformity and
have disparate application).
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to build (e.g., information that is in the public domain, abstract ideas,
242
or (b) by imposing
natural phenomenon, and laws of nature);
restrictions without an adequate public policy justification. This
preemption analysis brings us back to the essential question that should
be asked about all tort theories: What is the “wrong” sought to be
remedied? Historically, competition, and even aggressive competition,
243
was not a compensable wrong.
To the contrary, it has long been
244
recognized that competitors have a privilege to compete. It is also not
wrong for individuals and companies to copy and use ideas and
information that are in the public domain.
In contrast to the Florida statute at issue in Bonito Boats, state trade
secret laws (if properly limited in scope and application) are not
preempted by federal law because: (1) they do not interfere with the
incentive rationales of patent and copyright law; (2) they do not protect
information upon which others should be allowed to build; and (3) they
seek to punish wrongful activity that is qualitatively different from
patent and copyright infringement. In other words, they are consistent
with the dual purposes of federal intellectual property protection: on
one hand, they provide another form of incentive for invention and
creativity; on the other hand, they do so without unduly restricting free
competition. The foregoing limitations on state trade secret laws are
reflected in three features of the UTSA: (1) the requirement of secrecy;
(2) the narrow and weak scope of available protection; and (3) the
requirement that the defendant in a trade secret case be shown to have
245
engaged in “misappropriation.” The latter feature means that instead
of minimizing the traditional objective of trade secret law (to prevent
unfair competition) because it does not align with the asserted
objectives of patent and copyright law, a court re-examining Kewanee
242. This terminology is used instead of simply referring generally to the “public
domain” as a way of acknowledging that there are different definitions and types of public
domain materials. See Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE
L.J. 783 (2006); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 68 (Winter/Spring 2003); Tyler T. Ochoa,
Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215 (2002). Not all
publicly available information implicates the anti-competitive goals that underlie the limits
placed on copyright and patent protection because not all publicly available information is
needed to encourage innovation and creativity. If this were not the case, then state laws that
seek to protect information privacy and rights of publicity would arguably be preempted
because, in large part, they restrict the use of publicly available information.
243. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §1, cmt. a (describing the
freedom to compete).
244. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 768 (Privilege of Competitor).
245. See Sandeen, supra note 11, at 676.
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should embrace it precisely because it is different.
D. Problem Four: The Court’s Reluctance to Engage in an “As Applied”
Analysis
Beginning with Sears/Compco and continuing with Bonito Boats, the
U.S. Supreme Court’s intellectual property preemption jurisprudence
246
has been frequently criticized.
The fact that Sears/Compco and
Bonito Boats found the subject state laws to be preempted and Kewanee
did not suggests to many commentators that the Court’s preemption
247
jurisprudence is inconsistent and flawed. As set forth in the preceding
argument, one flaw is the failure of the Court to articulate a clear,
unifying test. Another flaw is the failure of the Court to differentiate
between cases that apply a preemption analysis “in the abstract” and
those that apply a fact-specific analysis that focuses on the precise
nature of the information sought to be protected by the plaintiff.
The apparent inconsistency in the results of Sears/Compco, Painton,
Lear, Aronson, Bicron, Kewanee, and Bonito Boats that upset Roger
Milgrim and others can be explained by recognizing that some of the
courts were focused on the specific facts of the case while others
examined the preemption issue in the abstract. In both Sears/Compco
and Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court focused on the specific facts of
each case by noting that the information sought to be protected was
248
clearly in the public domain. In Lear and Aronson, the Court focused
249
on the timing and details of the subject license agreements. In Bicron,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a fact-specific analysis that
was later rejected by the Supreme Court in Kewanee, principally
because the Court feared that state courts could not determine the

246. See supra Section I.A.
247. See, e.g., Joan E. Schaffner, Patent Preemption Unlocked, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1081,
1114 (1995); Todd Wong, Patent Law: The Patchwork Approach of the Supreme Court and its
Interplay with State Law, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 581 (1991); K. David Crockett, The
Salvaged Dissents of Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 27 (1990).
248. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159 (1989); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
249. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 264-65 (1979); and Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins, 395 U.S. at 653, 655-60, 668-74 (1969). See also Studiengesellchaft Kohle, M.B.H. v.
Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The court observed: “[I]n examining the
interface between national patent policy and state contracts, the Supreme Court requires this
court to consider ‘whether overriding federal policies would be significantly frustrated, by
enforcing the license.’”).

2008]

KEWANEE REVISITED

353

250

patentability of trade secret information. In Painton, the district court
took a fact-specific approach to the issues while the circuit court applied
251
an abstract, policy-based approach.
In thinking about federal preemption, it is logical to assume that the
required analysis is not dependent on the particular facts of a case.
Since the basic issue of a preemption analysis is whether a state law
interferes with the purposes of federal law, it would seem that a
comparison of the two laws is enough. However, as common sense and
the record of the Supreme Court’s intellectual property preemption
jurisprudence indicates, this approach does not work in IP preemption
cases because the required analysis is dependent upon knowing the
nature of the information sought to be protected. Without reference to
specific information, there is no way for a court to know whether the
plaintiff seeks to protect information upon which others are allowed to
build, i.e., information that is in the public domain. The Kewanee Court
was able to skirt this inquiry by accepting the argument of the Ohio
State Bar Association that information that is in the public domain
would never be protected under the trade secret law of Ohio. Whether
this is true in all cases emanating from all States is the critical question.
As was shown in the case of Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., it is
possible for a state cause of action to be free from preemption generally,
252
Therefore, care must be
but for a specific claim to be preempted.
taken by courts in trade secret cases to be certain that claims of trade
secret misappropriation are not re-packaged copyright or patent
253
infringement claims.
250. Kewanee Oil Co., v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074, 1078 (6th Cir. 1973) (“Our
inquiry into the subject should be governed by certain facts which are admitted or obvious
from the evidence offered and the concessions of counsel. First, the trade secrets in question
relating to the processes, procedures and manufacturing techniques of Harshaw, as conceded
by counsel for Kewanee, were ‘patentable.’ . . . Second, the record demonstrates beyond any
doubt that the claimed trade secrets had been in commercial use for more than one year prior
to the commencement of this lawsuit.”). Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 49192 (1974).
251. Painton & Co., Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 223-25 (2d Cir. 1971).
252. 448 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006). In Laws, while the defendant conceded that
state claims for invasion of privacy and violation of the right of publicity could co-exist with
U.S. copyright law, it successfully argued that the plaintiff’s particular complaints amounted
to a re-packaged claim of copyright infringement. Id. at 1139.
253. According to the UTSA and common law principles of trade secret law, there are
three potential trade secret “wrongs”: the wrongful acquisition, disclosure, and use of trade
secrets. See supra note 2. Accordingly, there are possible factual scenarios in which the
method of acquiring a trade secret involved the act of reproducing the secret—one of the
exclusive rights of a copyright holder. Similarly, the acts disclosing and using an alleged trade
secret may align with a copyright owner’s distribution, public display, and public performance
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V. GUARDING AGAINST THE ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF STATE
LAWS
Kewanee, of course, will not be the last time that the U.S. Supreme
Court will consider whether a state law that treads upon federal patent
and copyright policies should be preempted. One would hope that
given the number of cases that it has considered related to the issue, the
number of suspect state laws will diminish over time. Unfortunately,
the combined effects of the business community’s love affair with
intellectual-property-like protection and new forms of perceived
wrongdoing engendered by digital technology and the Internet have led
to calls for expanded trade secret protection and new state unfair
254
competition laws. Thus, questions of federal preemption will continue
to arise. If these questions went directly to the U.S. Supreme Court,
where in recent years it has expressed concern about the anti255
competitive effects of expansive intellectual property protection, then
the anti-competitive consequences of poorly drafted and applied state
laws might be short-lived. However, since the starting point for all
challenges to state laws is at the trial court level, it is important for trial
judges to get the intellectual property preemption analysis correct the
256
first time.
Otherwise, there is a risk that new state causes of action
will be used as inappropriate competitive weapons and innovation and

rights. It cannot be stated categorically, therefore, that trade secret claims never concern the
exclusive rights of copyright holders.
254. See, Elizabeth A. Rowe, Introducing a Takedown for Trade Secrets on the Internet,
2007 WIS. L. REV. 1041 (2007) (suggesting a legislative mechanism for the take down of trade
secrets that are posted on the Internet and arguably within the public domain); Vincent
Chiappetta, Employee Blogs and Trade Secrets: Legal Response to Technological Change, 11
NEXUS 31 (2006) (arguing that employee blogging requires a reexamination and broadening
of trade secret protection); and Note, The Law of Trade Secrets: Toward a More Efficient
Approach, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1269 (2004) (proposing a simplified and arguably broader
approach to trade secrt protection ). See also, Burbank Grease Services, LLC v. Sokolowski,
717 N.W. 2d. 781-788 (Wis. 2006) (holding that Wisconsin’s version of the UTSA did not bar
common law claims for the misappropriation of information not qualifying for trade secret
protection).
255. See, e.g., KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007);
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003); TrafFix Devices, Inc.
v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529
U.S. 205 (2000). See also David E. Shipley, What Do Flexible Road Signs, Children’s Clothes
and the Allied Campaign in Europe During WWII Have in Common? The Public Domain
and the Supreme Court’s Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 13 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L. J.
57 (2005).
256. See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 215 ( “To the extent there are close cases, we believe
that courts should err on the side of caution and classify ambiguous trade dress as product
design, thereby requiring secondary meaning.”).
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257

creativity will be hampered.
In the intellectual property context, it is important for attorneys and
judges to understand that the preemption issue is not just about the
relationship between the state and federal government. It is also about
preserving the balance between intellectual property protection and free
competition that the federal IP laws seek to achieve. The Sears/Compco
and Bonito Boat cases represent one line in the sand that states cannot
cross, i.e., the protection of content upon which others should be
allowed to build. But given the free competition concerns that underlie
both cases, it would be improper for trial courts to fail to consider the
anti-competitive effects of state law generally.
As the foregoing analysis reveals, challenges to state laws based
upon the belief that they are preempted by patent or copyright law may
present at least three different scenarios: (1) the Goldstein scenario,
where state law protects information that is left unprotected and that is
not expressly excluded from protection by federal law; (2) the
Sears/Compco scenario, where state law protects information that is
excluded from protection, e.g., information that is in the public domain;
and (3) the Kewanee scenario, where state law protects information that
can also be protected by patent or copyright law. The first task of a
court in examining a challenged state law should be to determine which
scenario applies. One complication is that the content sought to be
protected might fall under more than one scenario.
Another
complication is that, although the state statute may, on its face, apply to
a limited set of information, the plaintiff might be trying to protect a
broader class of information.
If the Sears/Compco scenario is implicated, then the statute should
be preempted because it is clearly anti-competitive, i.e., it prevents the
use of information that federal policy states is of a type upon which
inventors and authors should be allowed to build. If the Goldstein
scenario is implicated—an unlikely event given the post-Goldstein
expansion in the scope of patentable and copyrightable subject matter—
then presumably there are no anti-competitive effects because the state
law is designed to protect information that is neither expressly included
nor excluded from protection under federal law. However, a court
should still consider whether the state law interferes with the incentive
rationale of patent and copyright law and whether there is a sufficient
public policy reason to justify the restrictions on free competition.
257. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Kramer, How Misuse of the UTSA Can be Countered, LA
LAWYER (Nov. 2000) (describing abuses in trade secret litigation).
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Under the hybrid Kewanee scenario, some content that could be
protected by federal law is clearly protected by state law as well. This
creates a direct conflict between federal and state law. In such cases,
there should be a justification for the restriction on the use and
dissemination of information that is of sufficient import to override
society’s interest in free competition. In the case of patent and
copyright, we get greater innovation and creativity. In the case of
contract law, we preserve the sanctity of contracts. Arguably, in the
case of privacy laws, we preserve human dignity. In the case of trade
secret law, we prevent unfair competition. This suggests the following
simplified rule for IP preemption: If an adequate independent wrong
(i.e., independent of the wrongs that give rise to patent and copyright
infringement claims) can be articulated, then the state law will not be
preempted unless the state law interferes with the incentive rationale of
patent and copyright law or attempts to protect content upon which
258
others should be allowed to build.
Finally, just because a state law may not be preempted “on its face,”
259
does not mean that it should not be preempted “as applied.”
For
instance, trial courts that handle trade secret cases that are brought
under the UTSA or similar state trade secret laws must be careful not to
create a conflict with federal patent and copyright law by enabling the
over-assertion of trade secret rights. This is particularly true when the
state law claims attempt to protect information that falls within the
broad scope of patentable and copyrightable subject matter, i.e., matter
that is both explicitly protected by patent and copyright law, and matter
that is expressly excluded from such protection.
When assessing claims based upon state statutes, courts can reduce
the potential of misapplying the suggested rule for IP preemption by
asking the following questions:
1. Does the claim interfere with the incentive rationale of
patent and copyright law or the inventive or creative
process?
2. If the answer to the foregoing question is in the affirmative,
then the state law should be preempted. However, if the
258. Application of these two tests should preclude the enforcement of contracts that
purport to restrict the use of information that is in the public domain or that prevent
independent discovery and reverse engineering. See also Mark A. Lemley, Beyond
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 143
(1999) (discussing other arguments that should lead to the non-enforcement of such
agreements.)
259. See section IV.D. supra.
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answer is in the negative, courts should ask: Would the
enforcement of the state law otherwise hamper free
competition? For instance, does the state law prevent
inventors and authors from using information upon which
they should be allowed to build?
3. If the answer to the foregoing question is in the affirmative,
then the following questions should also be considered:
a. Does violation of the state law require wrongdoing
that is qualitatively different from patent and
copyright infringement, i.e., what is the underlying
wrong that the state law is trying to remedy?
b. Is the application of the state law limited to actual
wrongdoers?
c. Are the remedies that are available under state law,
particularly injunctive relief, limited in time?
d. Do any other features of state law exist that limit the
scope and application, and therefore the impact on
free competition, of the state law?
Unless the scope and duration of the state law and any claims based
thereon are limited and society gets something in return, then “the game
(i.e., the protection of trade secrets or other information) is not worth
the candle (i.e., the restrictions on free competition).”
CONCLUSION
The changes that have occurred in patent and copyright law since
1974, while undermining the reasoning and factual assumptions of the
Kewanee decision, do not compel a change in its outcome. But, as
argued in this article, they do require courts to re-focus their attention
on the dual aspects of federal intellectual property policy, i.e.,
encouraging innovation and creativity without unduly restricting free
competition. In the rush to protect the fruits of one’s intellectual labor,
it seems that many courts have forgotten the first principle of
intellectual property law: that competition is the rule and intellectual
property protection is the exception. As the foregoing reexamination of
Kewanee establishes, the safety valve that saves state trade secret law
from preemption problems is the fact that, when properly applied, it
does not unduly restrict free competition in information. Other state
laws that attempt to provide protection for information should be held
to the same standard.

